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Abstract

Attempting to find a solution to the problem of how to make art that is both critical yet participatory,
sobject explores subject/object relations within the development of the medical gaze in the history of
medico-clinical perception and Modern Art. Sobject works both analytically, tracing these apparently
parallel developments, and synthetically as it forms a methodological approach from the interpolating
spaces of each. It locates and analyzes histories of objective instrumentation between subjects and
objects, then works to open and redistribute these into new possibilities. It does this by developing an
artistic practice that engages with contemporary forms of institutionalized instrumentation, image,
artifice and objectivity. The development of this historical and artistic methodology is considered in
relation to the production of three installations: epluribusunum, Vivarium and sobject. Through an
analysis of the critico-participatory problems occurring in epluribusunum and Vivarium, sobject is able to
arrive at a solution.

Working to uncouple subjectivity from a constituency with determinative and idealistic ends of Modern
mediation, sobject works from the premise that all form is extra-empirical and all objects extraobjective. Attempting to (un)capitalize the disunity and diffuse nature of subjective experience, sobject
proposes that in order for artistic production and its subsequent reception to occur critically, without
participating with the same institutional and instrumental structures with which it critically engages,
reception must take place in the multiplicity of aesthetic participation. This practice can best emerge
from, and within, the context of institutional and instrumental analysis, critique and collaboration.
Conditioned by a culture of surveillance and visibility, sobject’s conclusions are really premises in which
visibility, artifice and image are often imbued with non-reciprocated interests. These aestheticized forms
traffic under objectivity on their way to public fact. Sobject asserts that it is subjective participation and
critical collaboration between art and science that can ‘re-cord’ ports and ‘re-port’ visual ‘re-cords’.
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Figure A: sobject; Installation View

sobject
A Thesis for Master of Fine Arts
Submitted By: Warren W. Lloyd III

Conclusion(S): A Prologue of Sorts

In the process of producing any object—whether physically constructed, through the act of writing, in
the timbre of speech, or conceptualized internally in an object of thought—one comes to that process
already conditioned by an array of premises and conclusions. So in essence, every beginning is already a
consortium, of sorts, between sets of seemingly determinative ends and undetermined sobjective
potential. I begin with a conclusion, of sorts, to highlight this systemic process, always already at work,
not only in our divided, bio-powered paths through society, but also charged and imbued in the images
and semblance(ed) objects of global life. Before sobject is anything else, it is a process by which to defer
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ends and open beginnings, to re ‘cord’ ports and reshape ‘re-cords’. In sobjectivity, conclusions are a
beginning.

Sitting down to write about my thesis project reanimates some of the central tensions the constructed
work sought to exhibit, those connected to the labor of constructing, locating, distributing, packaging,
marketing, reifying and sublating a historical experience, in the context of a technologically produced
and consumed culture. My present challenge, the writing of this thesis and the historicizing of the multi
valiant influences involved, brings into immediate focus two questions I attempted to address in sobject,
the final exhibition.

The first of which is a query into the impact language and text, and through them certain types of
means-end logic, have on experience and more specifically, in the context of the cultural institution of
an art school, the impact they have on aesthetic experience. What follows is my humble attempt to
merge the apparent binary between something like performative writing, on one side, and descriptive
writing on the other. While at times this document critically engages with scientific objectivity and its
instrumentation, sobject is less a criticism of science and its images and procedures, and more a form
through which to bring scientific objectivity and artistic practice together. As the research for this
project will show, both science and art are inspired and subjective in their own ways. Not only does
sobject seek scientific research as collaborative material, but it is equally motivated by raising the
theoretical and scientific practice of art. In this way, sobject is both historically analytic and
contemporaneously synthetic. It attempts to locate historical genealogies and their objective
instrumentations, and then begins to open and redistribute these into new possibilities, through a
process of engaging the contemporary, which by nature of its newness and complexity, exceeds
genealogical analysis alone.

Sobject’s point of departure begins at a logical and material opposition, which existed in the historical
movement of the Avant-Garde and in Modernist art theory, in the mid-twentieth century. This polarity
was between theories of autonomy and the possible social purpose of art and artistic practice. This was
perhaps most visibly evident in the simultaneous development of Pop-Art, high-abstraction and the
subsequent development of Minimalism in New York.1 In addition to this art-historical splintering,
sobject also takes theoretical root in debates beginning with European Dada, Modernist theater and
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classical Critical Theory; these debates still exist today, connected to differing notions about subjective
capacity, aesthetic reception and the immediacy of experience.2

Of course, the aesthetics of Modernism, in which theories of autonomy, social praxis, and the AvantGarde exist, has been being revised, reconsidered, critically challenged and opposed, for at least fortyyears prior to my entering RIT. Many have been attempting to construct a crime scene for the murder of
Modernism for quite some time. However, and in spite of some skepticism for an ‘institutionalized’
Relational Aesthetics, I agree with Nicolas Bourriard when he writes: “It is not Modernism that is dead,
but its idealistic and teleological version.”3 Through my research into Critical Theory, Post-Structuralism,
the History of Ideas and Cultural Studies, and the ways they overlap, discontinue, negate and crosspollinate, I was able to focus my work on how these cross-pollinations, negations, negotiations and
hybridizations occurred, in order to critically engage with structures that mediated and perpetuated
both autonomy and social use in art and science. I developed sobject across and between the permeated
borders of apparent modernist binaries, and their subsequent postmodern tensions, between objective
science and art, subjective expression, language and experience, sameness and difference, politics and
culture. In so doing, I continued to find myself focused on two sets of relationships. The first is the
seemingly simple but vastly general and incredibly complex relationship between subjects and objects,
and the second, exists between artistic criticality and participation.

Before I could create, mediate and structure, artistic practice and content in the environment of a
culturally institutionalized and technologically structured art school, I was compelled to first analyze the
questions posed and the concerns that arose through the process of attempting to produce content
about the structures and discourses which dictate, mediate and perpetuate content itself. This is what I
mean moving forward when I refer to aesthetic criticality. However, I should take a moment to clarify
that I do not mean aesthetic criticality to be associated with a specific form of emancipation, nor do I
assume that anything like symmetry exists between artistic intention and aesthetic reception. On the
contrary, it is my intention to vigorously search for new forms and positions of subjective activity
through a process of critically engaging current modes of cultural, artistic, political and corporate
mediation, as informed by their historical genealogies. I see this in direct contrast to what has been aptly
identified by Johanna Drucker as an institutionalized critical theory which, without the proper selfcriticality, can easily nestle into artistic prescriptions that can work against a dynamic and productive
methodology.4 I read Critical Theory as a subjective practice continually evolving and hopefully
6

continually reassessing its critical assumptions. Sobject is compelled by the decision to make rigorous
and continual analysis of the modes through which it is mediated, and thus, participates with, in an
effort to create new modes of subjective activity, interaction and sociality.

Sobject, then, is a thesis about my attempts to develop new possibilities for aesthetic criticality despite,
and in spite of, an inevitable complicity between the institution of art and its economy of cultural
industry. It tries to take into account the historicized fields of each by attempting to understand the
currencies and purchases already existent in the self- perpetuating processes of that history and by
creating divergent forms of aesthetic participation, developing unforeseen sobjective positions, fusings,
groupings and activities.5

Aesthetic theory, artistic practice and aesthetic reception have developed historically, and continue to
develop contemporarily, within oscillating spaces between subjects and objects. This is the reason, or
unreason, why it is at the structure(s) of these nodes that sobject is focused. One cannot imagine, not to
mention produce, a piece of artwork without first coming to a set of decisions with regard to both the
subject and object of the potential creation, notwithstanding developing some insight into the modes
that such decisions themselves are made in a world of ubiquitous traffic between objects and subjects.6
My goal is to explore ways to build critical inquiry into aesthetic production, so that its reception can
begin with, and develop through, historically structured assumptions about mediation and agency.

One premise that sobject begins with is that all experience is both mediated and yet mediates. Like the
people in whom it exists, it consumes while being produced. However, unlike orthodox aesthetic
reflection, it assumes that those being produced are producing themselves and have the ability and
subjective power to do more than just reflect their economic, ideological or social conditions. In
sobject(s) they have the subjective capability to express them, to express in them. In this historical
process, people have always possessed the ability to shake-free from, change and reinvent what Adorno
has referred to as constitutive subjectivity, connected to theories of the hegemonic, institutional, or
ideological structures that have sometimes been assumed to over-determine subjectivity. In sobject(s),
the concept of reflection itself, is not so much socially, institutionally or even economically determined,
but has the ability to become instrumentally, and thus, logically over-determined, by concepts of
equivalence and totality which haunt economies and positions of subjectivity. In and through expression,
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sobjects: plural, can redefine, mutate, undetermine and reconfigure the cultural, social and the
economic.

In sobjects expression is the reformation and dissemination of subjective activity, even in the
appropriative act of something once theorized as passive consumption or in the active distance of
contemplative protest.

However, to work under the pretenses of art toward the production of something like art or aesthetics
requires an examination of those pretenses, as they are the contemporary material that aesthetics and
thus subjective activity create. Work, play, innovation, collaboration and spontaneity within and
between the structures of both objective and subjective production can help to avoid the common
pitfalls of either epistemological purity on the one hand, or idealism and ideology on the other. Both
have to do with mediations of sobjective space within and of experience. However, sobject is not an
imposition, it seeks no pedagogical telos, no determinative message, theory or ideology; but it does seek
to build from an inherent condition in which theorized divisions between subjects and objects,
emancipation and oppression, knowledge and ignorance are no more prescient than the active and
imaginative choices people make or can make, and no more unsurpassable than the enlightenment was
successful at suppressing human subjectivity. While it would be naïve to imply that politics could be
absent from any social interaction between objects and subjects, in a public sphere or otherwise, it is
better to leave those politics for the other side of reception, in the multiplicity of reception, in the aura
of that impenetrability. To paraphrase Jacques Ranciere, it is not the function of knowledge to create
possibilities for equality among people, but only recognition of an ever-existing equality among people
that can ever create anything like a representative knowledge. In sobjects, art can and does produce
knowledge.
*************************************************************************************
The ostensible subject matter of my artistic production while working toward sobject at RIT, such as the
medical gaze, instrumental institutionalization, grids, surveillance culture, history, language or poetics,
was always guided by the particular challenge posed by attempting to produce content about, and
inevitably within, the structures and discourses which mediate, negate and or perpetuate content itself.
This focus on the structures of mediation was equated with my choice of subject-matter. Through this
rhetorical-material process I was recreating sobject-matter. The areas of cultural inquiry into which I
ventured had to do with their connection to, and inevitable powers of, subjective and societal mediation
8

and the ways that they merged to create forms of apparent semblance, artifice and image, trafficking
under fact, on their way to public truth. To leave the structures of discursive and sobjective mediation
un-analyzed, even in an era of spectacular apparitions against which some have assumed we have little
chance at our own subjective realities, would be to advocate and reify a classic route outlined by
Nietzsche and identified by Benjamin, as the eternal return to the same, not to mention help to confirm
the thesis of The Society of the Spectacle.7 This central conceptual thrust for sobject acted productively
as a first question to tackle in my own artistic practice. From the working-through of this practice, the
development of an aesthetic strategy worked heuristically as its receptive form took shape(s).

How one approaches what has been identified by Robert Kaufman as the ‘crisis-question’ of whether
and how, critical thought and agency are still possible has to do with the way one theorizes subjective
mediation.8 In a critical tradition one should automatically be suspicious of the premise. Critical thought
and agency have always been possible and quite active, even when critical thought and agency were
theorized as modes of redemptive knowledge for people who were already actively engaged in their
own modes of redemption, never considering, never-the-less accepting, something like complete
structural determination by roles of class or labor, always more conscious of what was taking place than
some restrictively imagined. A focus on the inevitability of mediated perpetuity between subjects and
objects—sobjects, takes on a particularly important role considering the pervasiveness of, and the
complexity by which, technology does not just mediate, but through cyclical processes of
instrumentation, division, incorporation and thus, excorporation—it structures, develops, mutates,
distorts, decomposes and perpetuates —in essence it recomposes certain modes of vision, perception
and cognition. These structures of perception loop continuously back into themselves and inevitability
form the interpolated forms of ideology and politics, pleasure, pain, success, failure and health, drawing
lines of access and isolation, constructed-autonomy and social praxis.

In what follows I will attempt to link the integrated development of my critical methodology and my
artistic practice.

Subjectivity as an un-constrainable, malleable and resistant, yet central element in any structural
development was an idea with which I approached all of my research and any material form I set to
create in the studio. In addition to this general idea about the power of subjectivity, Adorno’s work on
aesthetics in Aesthetic Theory, particularly with respect to language and logic, was important to my
9

artistic production. Walter Benjamin’s concepts of Aura and the ‘now of a particular recognizability’
proved central to both my approach to history and, perhaps more importantly, how I structured the
working process in my studio.

After establishing the development of my methodology and artistic practice, sobject, the thesis
document, moves into and through an analysis of specific artwork I created while at RIT. In each of these
instances, I attempt to outline both my research concerns and how they worked together to create the
material of each piece. The work of Michel Foucault and Lisa Cartwright proved fundamental to the
development of all of my work at RIT; however, both the conceptual framework and the outward
content of the installations epluripusunum, Vivarium and sobject, are closely connected to this historical
research. Through descriptive analysis of each piece—the research insights, the material decisions, the
metaphorical content, and a consideration of each of their constructed outcomes—this thesis document
will hopefully develop a range of possible meanings.

In addition to the research and my working process, and how I dealt with both in relation to each other
and an imagined space of reception, I also attempt to seize upon and describe the ways I dealt with one
of the most important concerns of sobject: the issue of participation. The problem that animated the
creation of each piece and which I attempted to solve in sobject was: how to make work that both
critically engaged with historical and contemporary structures of subjective mediation and enacted an
environment in which the development of new, unplanned, spontaneous, and subjective positions, were
possible. In other words, how to make work that was both critical and participatory.
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1: Adorno, Benjamin and
Kant: The Development of a

Creative Methodology
There is no purity entailed in
autonomy and yet form is among
the most important elements for
the type of aesthetics for which
Adorno is making the case. A
revision of the old binary trope of
form vs. content and I assume
subject/object. It is through form
that the content of a work is
articulated and it is sedimented in
form that one can draw content
which is what actually attempts to
negate or challenge form. An
artwork has within it charged
particles of meaning organized into
a form which when felt in and
through the subjective perception
of the subject will always have
remainders of charge that in its
disunity, its diffuse nature
theoretically threaten the form
through which it was perceived in
the artwork, but also in the subject
itself. That all artwork is extraempirical and all objects extraobjective charges the tension
between form and content.
Fig 1: 2006 Notes from the flyleaf
of Aesthetic Theory, Theodor W.
Adorno.
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Kant: The Determinative Constituency of Subjectivity and the Object

In his famous Critique of Judgment, the manifold book linking the Critique of Pure Reason and the
Critique of Practical Reason in an organic systemization toward the development of morality, Immanuel
Kant theorized an inversion of object and subject. Rather than make attempts to form human
knowledge by the structures and objects that exist without: “We must therefore make trial whether we
may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our
knowledge.”9 Theorizing that the subject is central to determining the relationship between the
objective world and subjectivity and or experience, Kant conceptualizes judgment as an interplay
between subject and object. By seeking to solve the antinomy of taste —a logical contradiction brought
about by the query into the ways in which one can make subjective claims about objects which by virtue
of their empirical reality should hold true universally, Kant makes a critical distinction between
determinative judgments, which subsume a universal under a particular i.e. This is flower, and reflective
judgments (this is beautiful). For Kant, determinate judgments have purpose and act directly as
conceptual categories, whereas reflective judgments activate what Kant identifies as ‘purposiveness’ or
the subjective process of searching for a category. Purpose and determination interplay with
purposiveness and the indeterminate. Subjective, reflective judgments are the natural activity of man’s
subjective search for what exists outside or beyond the (immediately perceived) empirical and
determined judgments and are thus the nature that unifies the heterogeneous. Aesthetic delight, Kant
asserts, is the recognition of man’s movement toward determined reason mirrored or seen in the
immediacy of the determined object. His subjective action, the purposiveness of his judgments, though
particular and subjective, in the extra-conceptual, is thus universal in its heterogeneity.10

Like the word ‘unity’ itself—a function of signification representing a dissonant and indeterminate
excess—unity or universality is put here to parenthetical or elliptical use as a marker, an active
recognition of an indeterminate space, determined by variations of distance and location, for that which
extends beyond the determinate and immediate perception of a concept —the structure for a subjective
space of moving toward the possibility of objectified subjectivity.

The attempt of Kant and through him the thrust of the enlightenment, which put generally, had as one
of its goals to emancipate the human animal from the vagaries of nature through the creation of, and
domination through, objective knowledge and reason, was to begin to objectify human subjectivity. The
12

categorization of heterogeneity with a theorized unity (homogeneity) of a subjective process contains in
it a logical solution for Kant’s system (and any total system for that matter) because it tidily shelves the
immense collective power of human subjectivity with determinative—means-end—reason. However it
also possesses a paradox to which much contemporary aesthetic theory, philosophical, historical and
cultural debate can be genealogically connected. In addition to the logical paradox which theorizes
subjectivity as a unified heterogeneity working toward objectified determination in human judgment, it
brackets subjective origin singularly without much reference to societal, institutional and historical
structures and force. However, whether put to use toward the development of determinative objectivity
or toward the development of archetypical identity or not (genius), looking at Kant’s attempt to bracket
heterogeneous subjectivity as a homogeneous unity can be seen, productively, as a rhetorical symbol for
an impossible problem. If anything, it points immediately to the difficulty of using totalizing theory or
logic to constrain subjectivity, and it points to the inevitability of always existent subjective remainders
in all conceptualized objects. In this way, subjectivity can be seen as constitutively coupled with
determinative reason. However, if one wanted to un-determine certain notions of determination,
certain moralities, political or religious dictates, or even aesthetic decrees, for instance, it would have to
occur through a subaltern uncoupling underway(s) in the modern era.

Adorno:
Uncoupling the Constituencies
Working against Kant’s attempt to systematize subjectivity into an objective, determinative and thus a
developing, constitutive ontology, Theodor Adorno sought an aesthetic theory aimed at utilizing the
subjective remainders inherent in all aesthetic and conceptual objects.

Adorno’s paradoxical and deliberate difficulty is often the result of his aesthetic project. He
systematically attempts to unravel the categorizations of classical aesthetics in an attempt to textually
perform his aesthetic theory. Even quoting him can be a dangerous affair because removing his writing
from the aesthetic context of its construction can threaten the thrust of his ideas.11 This is due primarily
to Adorno’s performative prose, made to purposely obfuscate the logic of its own autonomous
structure, which is purposefully imbued and subjectively charged with elements that negate or at least
are not completely contained in its own structures—in its own way performing the impossibility of
autonomy. His writing gestures toward the apodictic as it attempts to materially perform through
paratactic structures rather than illustrate through traditional methods of subordination and
13

conclusion.12 This choice for Adorno was the implementation of an aesthetic strategy toward the
practice of aesthetic theory(s), an attempt to rewrite aesthetic theory from the inside of traditional
aesthetic categories, rather than try to explain non-instrumental reason with instrumental, means-end
reason. This is connected to what Max Horkheimer and Adorno had attempted to discern as the logical
failings of the enlightenment.13 Against the backdrop of Fascism, the goal of human emancipation from
natural necessity and the second nature of human constraint had failed because the domination of
nature could only happen at the expense of subjectivity. Adorno’s complex and seemingly non-social
theory of autonomy rests in a belief that concepts developed by means-end reason, because of the
impossibility of dominating nature (subjectivity being a main element), are actually artifacts molded by
the territory over which the enlightenment was never able to effect its full dominion.14 From the
perspective(s) of non-determined subjectivity new perspectives can be given forms. From autonomy,
subjectively charged by non-instrumental reason, one can discern in what Adorno describes as a flash—
the double-shock of autonomy—which is the immediate critical explication of that which is extraconceptual and non-intentional in the object. This aesthetic activity can be seen as a process through
which to logically uncouple subjectivity from determinative logic, or at least seen as a process to open
up, multiply and reconfigure both.

While generalizations about, Adorno’s theoretical developments of autonomy and abstraction and their
connection to Greenbergian art-historical theories of autonomy, abstraction and flatness, make quick
business of the instrumental reason from which Adorno sought his whole life to release constitutive
subjectivity, they do no justice to the power of subjective remainders, always extra-conceptual and
extra-empirical. It is of course paradoxical, from the contemporary vantage point, that theories
developed by ideas of social equality and access could have developed into a theory of autonomy that
has since come to be known as esoteric, if not elitist, and from which divisions between myths of high
art and low art have been formed. Some of this may be explained by Adorno’s exasperation about
society’s seeming lack of sophistication and awareness of the forces at work behind and through its
products. This viewpoint too is possessed by totalizing theoretical pretensions that assume things like
passivity in aesthetic reception of popular culture and suppose something like a unified agency, or lack
thereof, could exist in something conceived of as the masses.

Although his work is often relegated to modernist guises of autonomy, Adorno’s work is as active as ever
in the current moment for the development of autonomy as a temporary refuge, a “rescue” without
14

which much contemporary art would be impossible.15 To connect unabashed criticality with Adornoian
theory or totalized negativity ignores the double negative implied by negative dialectics. I was interested
in the areas in Adorno, which in their difficult and paradoxical ways, seek to multiply, interrogate,
uncover and change the classical affirmative process implied by a dialectics, negating some for the
affirmation of others. Adorno’s work at the sobjective spillages and formal seepages of the permeability
of semblance in processes associated with subordinating human subjectivity to the determined
structures of efficiency and unitary access was (non) instrumental to the creation(s) of sobject. In certain
areas and in certain objects throughout the work I produced leading up to and eventually comprising
sobject: the exhibition, autonomy is often a piece of its theoretical and material semblance and thus
part of its sobject-matter. While there are layers of art-historical opposition and affirmation connected
to this inevitable semiotics, it is this niche in Adorno in which I have taken some refuge. Autonomy: a
non-space, a fundamental non- space, for the un-shielding of artistic activity where non-instrumental
subjectivity can work toward non-determined ends and thus beginnings, and start to complicate,
multiply and break up certain types of constituent subjectivity. Art-institutional buzz-words like
subversion and transgression stop short at the notion of the double negative in negative dialectics
without reference to the other side of the dialectic, which in this turn is multiple, divergent,
discontinuous and enacts the truth of semblance as the construction of an artifice— porous and charged
for human intersubjectivity.

This paradox is a deliberate and continual attempt to emphasize and activate subjective remainders that
are inherently extra-conceptual and resist full containment in any form. In spite of Adorno’s diligent
practice and prescriptions for autonomy and form in the arts, it is non-constitutive subjectivity: affirmed
through paradox and contradiction, a sieve-like dialectic process at work, on the material and in the
material of semblance and artifice, that interested me most in Adorno’s project. Sobjects develop from
these versions of this process which have helped to make up the methodological work of sobject.

While my creative methodology was developed by reimagining autonomy, through paradoxes in Kant
and practices of Adorno, as a personally subjective refuge in which to dislodge, reorder and defer
constitutive subjectivity, this is a general and abstract way to consider much of anything. As with
everyday life, there were several layers of development taking place, somewhat simultaneously, to
develop what eventually became sobject.
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In many ways, my artistic practices were also informed by an active process of historical inquiry which
comes from a speculative and idiosyncratic reading of Benjamin’s concepts of the Aura and history. It
was Walter Benjamin and his assessment of and creative methodological approach to history, together
with his enactment of fragment, allegory and an interest in popular forms of culture, followed by
Foucault’s historical genealogy, and finally the work of Lisa Cartwright that all blended into the
development of my own artistic methodology.

Benjamin: Subjectively Uncoupled History
Walter Benjamin, in his famous 1938 essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproducibility
describes Aura in terms of distance and loss. Aura is a “unique apparition of a distance, however near it
may be.”16 It is impenetrable; it contains, displays and hides fragments of history lost forever. He does
not so much as assert that technological reproduction completely evacuates historical and practical
reality from the objects of its work, but points to a crisis in early twentieth century perception which
was being conditioned by production for the sake of reproduction itself. Benjamin suggests that this
drastic alteration of experience marks the loss of authenticity and historical reality.

The loss of Aura, he speculates, rests on two things: “The desire for the present day masses to get closer
to things spatially and humanly, and their equally passionate concern for overcoming each other’s
uniqueness by assimilating it as a reproduction.” 17

From this Modern crisis in perception in which Aura is being lost and with it certain histories and
subjectivities at the expense of a quicksilver reification of the Modernist myth of sameness and
progress, two integrally linked though seemingly opposed strategies of aesthetic production develop
and can be connected to Adornoian and Benjaminian theoretical production: developments in genre
occurring in the parallel movements of Pop Art and Abstract Expressionism and the subsequent
development of Minimalism.

Both Adorno’s and Benjamin’s differing relationship to economic theory, and the faith placed in the
agency of the subjective potential of creation and reception are central to the direction each theory
developed for aesthetic production—apparent differences that still fuel debates and define strategies of
aesthetic production today.18 Benjamin either did not believe or was purposely obtuse about whether
culture and art—superstructure—could be completely determined by the infrastructure or the economy.
16

Instead, he theorized what he called phantasmagoria where orthodox economic theory theorized
commodity fetishism. It is not that Benjamin did not agree that commodity fetishism existed, but he
theorized something like a reconfiguration of the determining factors within superstructure and
infrastructure. Marx would have “ rejected the notion that a commodity-producing culture might be
able to abstract from the fact that it produces commodities in any other way than to cease to produce
commodities in the transition to a higher social formation.”19 Benjamin, however, focused on a major
logical flaw in the theory of reflection itself, through which one can theorize that the subjective
awareness of those commodity-producers could, in fact, abstract from their (not –completely)
economically determined commodity producing realities and subjectively express, rather than
objectively reflect the social realities of life.20 The relationship between the superstructure of culture
and the base of the economy, because Marx suggested that reflection occurred in a false and distorted
manner, meant that there could be, and in fact, must be potential to express, rather than simply reflect,
reciprocally and thus possibly change economic forces from within culture. If ideologies reflect in a
distorted and false manner, this dichotomy in Marxist theory could act productively in culture.21

What has been called Benjamin’s miss-comprehension of economic theory of aesthetic reflection can
easily be read as a productive and strategic entrance point for ‘less-than-completely’ alienated labor, or
the surplus value of subjectivity, which can produce an opportunity of inclusion and effect from the
bottom up. If one is to view the work of art, or the object of material culture—the superstructure,
through the lens of orthodox Marxist theory as a mere reflection or symptom of an economic system,
the infrastructure—then all potential for transfiguration from within is incapacitated from the start,
essentially giving way to a dangerous determinism that only radical revolution and violence could
eventually effect and as history has shown, has already effected.

The artistic methodology that I drew from Benjamin was a process by which to refunction cultural
objects and reproductions—the material of modern life—into constellative spaces, subjectively charged
and historically concrete, where the new can take place in relation to difference rather than the rational
myth of sameness. A historian who realizes that just because history develops by virtue of causation
does not mean that any given cause is necessarily historical by virtue of its being a cause. A historian
who realizes that history has become historical by events that may be separated by events that have
occurred thousands of years apart:
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…stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the
constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a
conception of the present as the “time of the now” …22
Through this process certain mythological veils of modernism, spun by the new from appropriations and
fragments of sameness, reproductive reification, autonomous art and economic class divisions, will
become frayed—and the fraying, netted grid-work of the veil can come into view as what it is and its
function as a-sembled artifice would cease to separate and fall away as just another artifice, another
material piece of everyday life. This process, one can speculate, brings true history into view. The
objects and subjects of history can be seen contemporaneously with their true historically concrete
realities made evident in the now or what Benjamin termed the ‘now of recognizability’. In this “now of
a particular recognizability,”where, following Rolf Teideman’s deft analysis that “truth is charged to the
bursting point with time,” stasis functions like a momentary, yet permanent, capture, “where time itself
is condensed into a differential.” 23 Thus in time (stopped temporarily), somehow contained in the
detail, a monad is not possessed of the Whole, but rather a whole, which is to say a fragment whose
whole truth is more real, more historically concrete, than the myth of modern progress, or economic
totality for that matter. A whole, rather than the Whole forms the basis of “a now of a particular
recognizability” in sobject.24

To imbue an object with the historical specificity of the material of life and through that process, endear
it with a specific subjective energy unguided by instrumental, means-end reason is to recreate history in
the now of a particular recognizability, in an era of increasing auratic loss. This in turn constellates the
dialectical veil of history and makes it available to the present. In this contextual process, an object can
be the inversion of a symbol or revision of a metaphor made historically concrete by its
contextualization in the historical present. This process of refunctioning both classical symbolism and
allegory by multiplying, complicating and inverting culturally new objects by recontextualizing them
historically in the web-work of their constellative construction, creates a mode through which to bring
history forward, which simultaneously refigures the contemporary moment with an unforeseen,
historically concrete truth. This stands in direct contradistinction to a history that seeks to transport one
back and places an emphasis on a subjective agency strong enough to wrench objects from their current
alienating function. History is the activation of the historical in the now of its particular recognizability. It
was this reading of Benjamin—my own sobjectively received and non-instrumentally imagined
interpretation—that informed the development of my artistic methodology as I worked toward sobject.
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Where Benjamin was concerned with the images and products of culture and their ontological charge
and possible purchase, Adorno’s concerns focused over time more on the teleology of reason and thus
on a central element in the project of the enlightenment, mentioned above, which he saw as its failure.
Where Benjamin can be seen as planting the seeds for an active engagement with, and open
manipulation of cultural objects (linguistic, cognitive and material), Adorno further developed a
theoretical and social space that had been developing for artistic production since art lost its ritualistic
function in the Middle Ages—the space of autonomy. Adorno’s theory of autonomy is one that
developed over time—time that Benjamin was never able to witness. However, if by some chance of
fate he were able to read Adorno’s late work, he would recognize his own influence. For instance,
Adorno’s theorization of Force Field theory, or the Constellation, has roots in Benjamin’s Now of a
Particular Recognizability:

The artwork is both the result of the process and the process itself at a standstill. It is what at its
apogee rationalist metaphysics proclaimed as the principle of the universe, a monad: at once a
force field and a thing. 25

While forming a nexus around the idea of monadic constellative aesthetics, Adorno and Benjamin
diverge in the material access to such a monad. For Benjaminian theory, objects of popular culture can
mingle in ambiguity with timeless, yet historically concrete allegory and fragment, while Adorno’s
monad is one of high art where the objects of popular culture can only reflect the alienation of
commodity fetishism of bourgeoisie society (kitsch), whereas in social and artistic autonomy, highartists and their art somehow supersede the means-end utility fundamental to the failures of the
enlightenment: That of the emancipatory project of humanity from the necessity of nature.

While a certain didacticism has come to be associated with art-institutional formulations of the critical
tradition genealogically taking root in Adorno and Benjamin, the fundamental significance they placed
on, and the highly creative and historically concrete ways in which both developed, what can be
theoretically described as subjective remainders, played a central role in the development of sobject.
They can be seen in many ways as the foundation on which, and thrust behind, the methodological
pollination from critical theory into cultural studies. A movement and methodology that, depending on
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one’s theoretical inclinations, can be seen as the enactment of force field theory being practiced from
the inside out as opposed to the opposite. I am referring to non-linear conceptions of art-history
performed both temporally, but also with relation to persistent themes which take root in critical theory
but have developed by looking at culture as a permeable, discontinuous, interchangeable and
participatory process, rather than as a structure of stasis or totality. Subjectivity is considered in terms
of position, space, continuously developing through interaction and interpolation, where objects are
assessed by their cultural and historical ontological charges.

The constructed polarity between autonomy, flatness and abstraction on the one side and social praxis,
popular culture and realism on the other is as much an institutionalized instrument of Modernism as it is
a real and distinct polarity. However, these distinctions still persist, particularly in the current activity
and art-historical development of art to such an extent, that there are ways in which artistic success or
failure can be measured against opposition or complicity. I use these concepts as symbolic and semiotic
material in my artistic practice and thus attempt to refunction them in the context of practical and
concrete intellectual query. I imagine my artistic practice and process as a reconstruction and
refunctioning of what Benjamin so aptly described as the ‘now of a particular recognizability.’

For Benjamin this space was defined as phantasmagoria or the dream-wish of society and the way he
conceives of breaking with and reconfiguring history. For Adorno it was the fundamental significance he
placed on the subjective remainders within autonomy and form which negate the structures by which
they were originally set to be dominated. It is from these overlapping and interpolating theoretical
moments in both Adorno and Benjamin and how they have disseminated into cultural studies and arthistorical theory, that I have produced an aesthetic methodology of critical inquiry and artistic
production.

One cannot create historically within a field without reference to the historicization of that field. Sobject
and its development make direct semiotic, allegorical and metaphorical use of the material of its own
historical development within the history of art as an institution.
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However, as I mentioned in the opening of this thesis, I have also chosen to investigate seemingly
separate structures of perception with parallel developments in society exhibiting unlikely unities,
dissonances, and surprising similarities—all of which come together at different points in time to create
the artifice, spectacle and semblance of objectivity. Some of the reasoning behind why I wound up
involved with genealogical studies of science and some of their medico-institutional structures had to do
with the compelling historical genealogies of Michel Foucault which, in many idiosyncratic ways, can be
linked to my interest in Benjaminian history. However, beyond these historical and methodological
affinities and oppositions (geneticist vs. monadic or force field), I was equally interested in the ways in
which objectivity was developed through the development and dissemination of images and image and
in how image and images became and become embodied.

From the time I matriculated at RIT my work dealt with investigations into the history of empirical
observation and surveillance within medical and institutional industrial complexes. The primary modes
of my aesthetic inquiry and presentation have always been informed by these investigations and my
material choices and systemic processes have always been structured by ideas that developed from this
parallel process of intellectual inquiry.
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Figure 1: epluribusunum; Installation View

2: Modern Mediation and the Early Structuring of Visual Perception:
Historical Process as Artistic Material
The Body is an inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus
of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual
disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of
the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history’s destruction of the
body. 26
During the development of epluribusunum, my artistic production was informed by a query into the
history of medical perception and its development of and by visual instrumentation, and was thus an
attempt to work within and through the historical and cultural inter-weavings and constructions of the
qualitative metrics of perception of objective health, positivism and unity in both the institution of art
and that of science and/or medicine.
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When I began work on epluribusunum, I was interested in an aesthetic query into the ways that
unstable, subjective and often arbitrary representations are often structured by the rules and limits of
instrumentality. Of even more significance to this work was the ways in which these representations
came together and structured public images and notions of objectivity and developed into embodied
structures of perception.

Michel Foucault’s concise research into the history of medical perception and the development of what
he calls the medical gaze quickly arrives at concrete examples in which language, sight, space and death
are integrally linked.27 Through highly specific historic genealogies beginning in the mid-eighteenth
century, Foucault’s research tracks the birth of medical perception through the privileged, subjective
loci of doctor’s and clinician’s writings and analysis, in which specific medical cases become viewed,
separated and compared; in which new homologies are abstracted from the individual, then reinvested
into the individual as a “portrait of a disease,” then inscribed, spliced and written onto other bodies;
through which classes and species are institutionalized together in a process of dynamic hybridization,
the specificity and subjectivity of which having long since disappeared by the force of the modes and
instruments of analysis itself, which become generalized constructions of perception and visibility,
eventually writing sight into the constructions of political consciousness.

Intuition
This begins through a process of the temporal and spatial flattening of the body of the patient. In
primary configuration space is flattened.28 By prioritizing positive analysis of disease, its location, its
visibility and how it compares to other images of analyzed disease, the individual body becomes negated
by language and analysis—by analysis itself. Time is abolished in favor of an image of a disease’s
projection on the surface of a body. Essences of diseases can subjectively, and often erroneously, be
deduced through analogy and similarity. When through classificatory disease methodology, time is
suspended in the name of similarity, an array of kinships or approximations develop into their own
identities. Comparison and analysis become their own identities as the identity of the individual recedes.
These identities have nothing to do with truth, much in the way that language develops and defines
itself, in relation to itself, erasing as it produces. However, it doesn’t take long before causality is
theorized around that which will not bend to the process of linguistic and visual instrumentation.
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Through what Foucault names secondary spatialization, a relationship of causality replaces identities of
kinships and the patient-doctor, doctor-family relationship morphs into a hermeneutics of pathological
facts. Here collective subjectivity based on privately collected statistics multiplies.29 And an emphasis on
the individual is first reemphasized as the medium through which to find, view and render symptoms
and disease. The body is used here as the material through which to prove already abstracted analogies
and speculative pathologies. The individual is used as a pallet from which the doctor paints. In this
process, the individual patient quickly disappears. This reversal of interest from the private concerns of
the real patient to the negation of the patient in favor of homologies, abstract analogy and totalizing
structures is an underlying paradox in secondary spatialization and the medical experience in general.
This movement in the eighteenth century, whereby doctors, scientists and clinicians were abstracting,
dividing, negating and splicing individuals, diseases and illness—under a larger project of emancipation
or enlightenment —was, in fact, constructing the concept of Humanity with these fusions and
hybridizations of negation, abstraction and sometimes death. Without positing a direct correlation, it is
enough to suggest that as I worked toward sobject, through epluribusunum, I was drawn to the
constellative overlap between some of the conceptual logic, force, purposiveness and utility of
subjectivity as it worked toward its own objects in secondary spatialization. There are interesting
similarities between secondary spatialization and theories of autonomy, flatness, purity and their
institutionalized structures in the development of Modern art and the Avant-Garde.

Enactment-Experimentation
It is then through tertiary spatialization where both primary configuration and secondary spatialization
are preserved and where the distribution, isolation, divisions and privileged regions and where the
whole corpus of primary and secondary spatialization confront social forms.30 To continue the historical
constellative metaphor it would be, here, in tertiary spatialization, where an allegory of autonomy and
social praxis clash, here the autonomously constructed becomes witnessed, interacted with and where
participation with its concepts would take place. It is a “locus of dialectics, of heterogeneous figures
where time lags and politics struggle, it is a space of demands and utopias, economic and social
confrontations.”31 It is where specialization develops its political consciousness. In tertiary spatialization
interests guide the embodiment of disease through the actual body of the individual patient and into
the organization of the embodiment of illness on the socius. Ordered in the hospitals and in the clinics of
specialization, diseases are brought together to mutate into more complex entities. Diseases no longer
run their natural course. Hybrids, offshoots, breeding grounds and supporting structures develop
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through the proliferation of specialization in a way that no longer has curing as its goal. Hospitals and
clinics become the place of maintenance and spread, and the sites of social, epistemic, and
observational privilege for managing the body-politic.

Conclusion
The shift from tertiary spatialization to political consciousness logically occurs next in the perceptive
construction of the medical gaze. In an ever-increasing political consciousness still evident in our time,
the power of medically perceived knowledge constitutes itself outside of the center of its own
development and enters into a collective space of totalization at the expense of the individual, in order
to achieve the geography of a history and of a state, developing from a science of negation and
abstraction into a positive science akin to the binary between the normal and the pathological.32

The institutional organizations that have developed around the forms of epidemic, mark the beginnings
of an overt political consciousness at the end of the eighteenth century. This consciousness was
developed around the inevitable policing of epidemics. In order to deal with the spread of morbid events
one must study and police the potential manifestations of morbidity. This takes a highly developed
perception within the medical gaze along with very detailed descriptions and localizations, an ever
increasing system of cross checking and comparison, and an ever increasing amount of finance. It
becomes in the interest of states to protect and police the spread of morbidity in the name of health.
The polarities of the morbid/health relationship developed into an increasing need for moralized ideals
to be spread.

This process describing the historically concrete ways in which medical perception developed a positive
science by virtue of its own logic of subjective analysis, instrumentation, abstraction, and
institutionalization through a continual mutation, negation, and eventual splicing and splintering into
hybridizations of disease and illness and moved rapidly into a public/political consciousness, may seem
unrelated to aesthetic development. However, it is through similar processes that we make the work
and the leisure of our continually monitored, separated, driven, patronized, marketed and earned lives.
In fact, the logical process that moves from primary configuration through political consciousness can
easily be detected in a certain ‘now of a particular recognizabilty’ evident in the billions of
interchangeable, bio-powered fluxuations of a common process in which we have always been in the
throes—to intuit (primary and secondary configuration) to enact (tertiary specialization) and to conclude
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(political consciousness)—thus is our socially constructed state of constitutive life. In particular, it is the
way in which these processes, now much more microscopic and effectively bio-powered, are packed
into images, artifice and semblance that is of considerable significance in our moment. Because of this,
coupled with my position in an institution of art and the way these processes overlapped with the
historical development of the field of Modern Art, my interest was drawn to work toward sobject
through epluribusunum. I recognized certain constellative points, forces and overlaps between Modern
Art and its institutionalization and modes of objective semblance in science and medicine. Both are
refunctioned and reified into the structures of popular perception and closely resemble each other in
the ways in which aesthetic production has developed and continues to work. The flattening of space,
movements toward abstraction, purity of genres and medium (instrumentation), formulaic
methodologies of each, mediated by career success and corporate sponsorship. In short, both have
become disciplines.33 The primary configuration here is that of the institutionalized artifice.

The process by which modern mediation grows from developed structures of perception stemming from
the body observed and oscillates back onto and into the body unobserved, structured both my artistic
practice and literally structured the form of my work.

I was motivated to make a self-referential system, structured as an institution coded with signifiers that,
depending on one’s location in space and reading of that particular space, would reference the
institution of medical perception while simultaneously referencing specific areas within the institution of
art. With Benjamin’s allegorical, fragmentary historical methodology coupled with Foucault’s deft
historical genealogies in mind, I chose ubiquitous, mass-produced visual material which I attempted to
charge metaphorically to employ in what I imagined at the time as an institutional allegory about the
interpenetrating structures of aesthetic and medical perception.
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Figure 2: epluribusunum; Close-up of Razors

Grids, Clouds and Milk
Like the doctors and clinicians in the eighteenth century, I viva-sectioned the mass-produced cloud
wallpaper of epluribusunum into a workable grid of spatialization and classification (Figure 1 and 2), first
eliminating its function as a unifying visual apparatus, then refunctioning the wallpaper through a
process punctuated by the material and metaphor of the razor-blade. I used these razor-blades as a
double-negative proposition and metaphor. They doubled as both a signified object of reason and,
through their functionality, simultaneously signified that which instrumentation often negates, cuts and
slashes—its own object. Each cloud panel is both held together by a physical razor-blade and
simultaneously separated by the purpose of the razor blade’s common use.

The grid has been a ubiquitous instrument in the history of art since the Renaissance through its use
structuring frescoes, its utility in the development of perspective, and its architectural integration.
However, it wasn’t until 1960’s and 1970’s in America that the grid as an instrument, in itself, was made
an object and subject of art. Most notably, the work of Agnes Martin and Ad Reinhardt each deals with
grids.

Rosalind Krauss has referred to the grid as “…the absolute autonomy of the realm of art, flattened,
geometricized, ordered, it is anti-natural, anti-mimetic, anti-real. It is what art looks like when it turns its
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back on nature. In the flatness that results from its
coordinates, the grid is the means of crowding out
the dimensions of the real and replacing them with
the lateral spread of a single surface. In the over-all
regularity of its organization, it is the result not of
imitation, but of aesthetic decree.”34 Krauss’s
decidedly critical analysis of the grid certainly has its
merits when held, as it was, against the antagonist of
Figure 3: epluribusunum; Baby Bottle Liners of Milk

an institutionalized Modernism. While there are

undeniable elements of Krauss’s criticism behind my use of the grid, I was interested in trying to work
with the grid in an ultimately productive way. 35

Depending on one’s historical or theoretical entrance point and whether or not one refers to a
centrifugal (open) or centripetal (closed) grid will, of course, dictates one’s construction of meaning. It
was this instrumental doubling that interested me when I began structuring epluribusunum.

Grids work like language, they serve a double function. They connect as they produce fissures; they
structure a place beyond while they are inherently structured by a limit. For some, they move toward
transcendence and a relationship with the Divine, while for others, they negate hope and faith, incised
by the razored inscriptions of reason.

I used the grid as both an overt visual reference in epluribusunum, but also as a less obvious mode
through which to structure the physical space of the installation and thus, similar to primary and
secondary spatialization in the work of Foucault, as a way to mediate bodies and structure movement in
the space. In addition to the clouds, both split apart and refunctioned, in the form of a grid on the
central wall of the installation (Figure 1), plastic baby-bottle liners were filled at various volumes and
placed on points or nodes on an invisible grid on the floor of the space (Figure 3). I organized these with
specific attention to the body so that one could physically maneuver between and through them.
However, one would need a heightened sense of space and movement of both self and others in the
grid in order to negotiate the space without spilling the precariously balanced bottle-liners of milk—
balanced as they were, by the weight of their own volume (Figure 1/3). I imagined this structured
process by which organically unstable objects, balanced by their own volumetric weight on points of an
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invisible grid, as an allegorical process through which the artifice of objectivity develops by attempts to
alter, constrain and mutate individual bodies for collective objectification. I imagined that the necessary
negotiations I was attempting to instill, by the precariously balanced milk, would produce a mode of
participation that could, in-turn, mutate, alter and change the structure of the institutional artifice—in
essence, creating a process by which participation and interaction were essential to the developing form
of the installation. Connected to the Foucaultian process which moves from tertiary spatialization to
political consciousness, this process multiplied into social
significance in this way: if sobjects chose to negotiate the
unstable and precarious mediations of epluribusunum’s
modernist, art-historical structure, they would then become
quite literally unstable organic structures themselves, trying to
negotiate and stay balanced within the unstable organic
structures that are formed by and through the modern symbol of
flatness, classification and comparison—the grid. If one failed to
balance or negotiate the space ‘correctly’, the true instability of
the liquid and the form in which it was contained would be
exposed more acutely—the milk would spill and the telos of the
Figure 4: Contained Milk

grid would become exposed as a more or less arbitrary mode
through which to mediate subjects, spaces, and
organic processes.

In an effort to heighten the structural instability of
the State-Brand Powdered Milk which literally
mediated the space of epluribusunum, I created a
display-shelf on which to evenly distribute closed
containers of the same milk (Figure 1/4). The
displayed and shelved milk had to be closed as it
represented a certain type of objectified artifice and
Figure 3: epluribusum; Oxygen mask, Roses and Baby's Breath

semblance. The contained milk on display was put

through variously different processes in which the milk began to color, separate, rot and harden (Figure
4). A common visual theme to each container of separated organic instability was connected to romantic
landscape painting, as each container when examined closely formally resembled miniature Casper
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David Friedrich paintings or William Turner seascapes. Beyond these indirect visual reference points,
however, I imagined these containers metaphorically charged by their literal description: an organic
process of immediacy brought to view in a process determined by its own instrumentation and visibility.

I chose the milk because it worked visibly and invisibly as an organic substance in a process of constant
disintegration made more pronounced and potentially quickened by the instrumentation of display
itself. However, I chose State Brand Powdered Milk, in particular for its metaphorical connection to the
Foucaultian process outlined above from tertiary spatialization into political consciousness in which
health and normalcy was equated with the State and geography of nations. However, I also chose State
Brand Powdered Milk because it was powdered—and thus for the literal process it entailed. In order to
make State Brand Powdered Milk one has to quite literally mix billions of dried particles with water,
literally making one substance from many—epluribusunum.

Like the grid which works both centripetally and centrifugally, epluribusunum utilized both open
containers of milk, structured on a grid in space, but also closed and contained milk on display. I chose
the shelving on the center wall of the installation for its multiplicity of potential meaning, but
paradoxically concrete connections to the processes taking place in the literal system implied by the
neologism epluribusunum, created by fusing the three separate Latin words e pluribus unum, again
making one from many, or in this case, a few. The shelves are literally Styrofoam packaging material. I
was interested in the way that literal packaging material designed to protect technology against the
duration of time and space could also act as a stable and
permanent symbol in a technology of display. The overt synthetic
materiality of the Styrofoam played against and negated any
potential naturalistic effect the clouds may have produced. This
emphasized the literal mass-produced plasticity of the cloud wallpaper.

Above the synthetic shelving unit and centered symmetrically,
was a plastic oxygen mask out of which protruded dead roses and
baby’s breath(Figure 3). Out of each corner of the shelving unit
ran a plastic hospital tube which fed back into a symmetrical hole
in the shelves’ opposite side, signifying an endless process of selfFigure 1a: epluribusum; Installation View
(smaller)
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referentiality and autonomy (Figure 1a). This reference to autonomy connected to the privileged space
of autonomy in the development of the arts and in particular painting, but it also connected with the
parallel development of modern structures of medicine’s visual culture.36 This closed autonomous and
symbolic space was metaphorically multiplied by the roses that fill, or close, the only opening on the
wall. The roses registered a myriad of art-historical significance. However it was their material
significance as a marker for both an entropic process (the roses are dried and flaking away) and a
metaphor for death and disintegration that most kept my interest.

The bright blue coloring of the packaging shelves was an
industrial blue often used in such material and also commonly
used on the walls of hospitals and modern institutions in
general. To strengthen this connection I painted the walls of
the installation space using bright blue paint. This is often
used to serve a double function: to produce an illusion of
brightness, happiness, and cheer, but also and perhaps more
importantly, to simultaneously protect the structure of the
institute itself, namely the surface of its walls (Figure 4). This
can be deduced from the location of such paint. Walls are
often painted in these industrially happy, yet decidedly drab
colors, in even strips that wrap endlessly around corners and
Figure 4: epluribusunum; Side Installation View

through wings of hospitals and institutions. They generally
reach from the floor to approximately four-feet in height. This

is where feet leave their marks and scuffles between technicians and patients leave their human imprint
and where gurneys scrape the edges and corners of the institutional structure.

Clouds are a common backdrop of everyday life. They make windows in institutions important. In them
we dream, escape and create—they persist for everyone no matter the circumstances. Clouds, like all
the material in my artistic practice, were chosen for the specificity of how they signify, yet also for their
capacity to develop multiple meanings—for their rare facility to be both general and particular. Like
Kant’s purposiveness, Adorno’s constituent subjective uncoupling, or Benjamin’s phantasmagoric
dream-wish, clouds represent the heterogeneity of subjectivity working. In them, however, determinate
ends can be deferred, ignored, changed and altered. Additionally, they offer a common backdrop to
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separate lives while also signifying the logical paradox of something like the homogeneity of
heterogeneously comprised unities, utopias or institutions. Clouds also reference a genealogy of
painting ranging from the guilds of cloud painters in the Renaissance to the historical lineage developing
from symbols of leisure in French Impressionism, from Boudin’s beach scenes through Monet’s largescale Water Lilies, in which the water reflects clouds in an allover pattern of natural immanence.
Following the lineage of large-scale impressionistic painting, they can represent, through his connection
with Monet, the overall-paintings of nature incarnate of Jackson Pollack and the American Abstract
Expressionists. In essence, they are the backdrop, symbol and object of many conceptual and visual
artifices and public images which have been used and disseminated as objective knowledge, and yet
they are as general, banal and yet spectacular and connected to social, institutional or subjective forces
as any form of institutionalized nature.

My choice to cover the entire surface of the main wall in the installation with clouds was a direct
reference to this all-over painting style stemming from French Impressionism through the New York
School of Abstract Expressionists. In an effort to critically engage this reference, I used mass-produced
wall-paper, the antithesis of authenticity, and I hung the clouds upside-down as a literal reversal. After
vivi-sectioning the rolls of cloud-wallpaper with the razor blades, which in the end wound up literally
hanging the gridded clouds, I began to inscribe the whole refunctioned surface with cursive handwriting
in a totalizing effort to cover the entire surface with the word epluribusunum. My attempt to unify the
surface, like the language I was attempting to signify in the process, was a fractured technology from the
start. To amplify the inevitable failure of language to make an experience whole and total, I fused the
three words E pluribus unum into one solid stream of text:
epluribusunumepluribusunumepluribusunum. I then terminated the process of all-over-writing after the
top third of the wall was covered. By fusing the separate words e pluribus unum into one word I was
literally enacting the meaning of the phrase: ‘out of many one’. And by stopping the attempt to cover
the entire surface with this process, I was signifying the failure and futility of language specifically and
the futility of instrumental reason generally to make whole any multiplicity that is dependent upon
difference and subjectivity.

*************************************************************************************
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3
Art and Objecthood: A Personal Genealogy
I have spent the time I have on epluribusunum because it was a foundational piece for my artistic
practice in several interrelated ways. When I entered RIT, I was educated from the perspective of a
contemporary painter rooted in the historical implications of Michael Fried’s seminal essay: Art and
Objecthood.37

Through attacks on the Minimalist artists, or as he deemed them “Literalist artists,” such as Donald Judd,
Robert Morris and Tony Smith, Fried uses theatricality and theater pejoratively as a sign of degeneration
and posits that the “success, even survival, of the arts has come increasingly to depend on their ability
to defeat theater.”38 Using predatory tropes of evolution, war and sports, the reduction of art from a
set of constituent parts that posited an organic whole, to its most singular elements of form, shape and
most importantly, its relationship with the body (subject) in space, was seen by Michael Fried as a type
of theatricality that was set to not just “crumble” the “individual arts” but to allow a kind of experience
that “persists in time” and thus continues ad-infinitum. He theorizes as if artistic experience and
aesthetic reception were not already temporally conditioned and mediated, not to mention politically
and institutionally conditioned as Fried’s essay, perhaps most paradoxically represents, in its own
formulaic prescriptions. Art is instantaneous and “at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest.”39
Fried’s conception of art is one that privileges the abstract development of human virtues within the
frame of which one could and thus should contemplate the autonomous—autonomously, however
much the virtues that define his theories exist outside the frame(s) of autonomy. Fried, in his attempt to
prioritize purity, virtue and their semblance in abstraction, constructs the barriers of privilege in the
name of Humanity without recognition to the world existing elsewhere, with no significance placed on
the traffic taking place between subjects and objects, a reciprocal passage from inside to outside or as
Derrida has theorized: passé-partout.

My undergraduate experience was primarily structured by certain dominant professors whose views
circulated around what types of decisions a painter might make in relation to Art and Objecthood, or in
relation to varying ideations of an evolution occurring in late-modernism, or as many might refer, in
“Postmodernism”. This is not the place to open up theoretical arguments about the existence of arthistorical movements, but suffice it to say, that my direction was guided by a frustration and open
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antagonism with certain culturally, socially and politically restrictive precepts evident in much latemodernist criticism, primarily those theorized by Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried.

I entered RIT knowing I wanted to make participatory art, or in my mind at the time, installation art. I
was interested in the ways in which one might produce an aesthetic experience out of which ideas could
develop, evolve and change with time, rather than produce rarified objects to be consumed and
collected. I was specifically concerned with questions pertaining to the area between artistic
commentary and artistic participation: how can an artwork operate critically within the framework on
which it is dependent? Before attempting to address this difficult question, my first problem was how
to make an installation. Through attempting to solve this formal and practical problem—how to activate
an entire space with materials and ideas which all work together to charge multiple levels of meaning
and discourses—I arrived at a better position to figure out why to make installations and to what end. It
was the failures of epluribusunum, or at least what I perceived as its failures, which were most valuable
aesthetically. For instance, I began the process motivated by a concern for participation from those who
experienced the space. As I mentioned above, I wanted to create a space where people entered the grid
and had to work together or at least become more aware of each other in the process of moving
through the bottle-liners of milk that were placed on an invisible grid on the floor. I assumed this was
the only way the meaning could emanate correctly into what Foucault would have deemed tertiary
spatialization or the area in which political consciousness begins formation. I wanted to build a
semblance created by and through human interaction in an effort to highlight that already existent
process. My goal was to use the literal attempt to contain unstable organic processes, balanced by their
own volumetric weight, to multiply into the physical interactivity of people involved in a parallel process.
I hoped the work would become a type of historically charged Benjaminian allegory. However, what
actually happened was that the grid, the precariously balanced containers of milk, and the risk they
exhibited, acted as a social repellant. People came into the space and stayed on the outside of the floor
structure. No one attempted to negotiate the overly-mediated space. At the time I wrote the whole
piece off as a failure because I theorized that it was just another painting, a visible artifact at which
people gazed. This was due to an over-emphasis on a material miscalculation, on the one hand, and
ignoring the connection this new meaning had to the ideas that generated the piece to begin with, on
the other.
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One of the most practical reasons people remained averse to the idea of negotiating the over-mediated
space of the floor on which the precariously balanced baby-bottle liners stood was due to a set of sterile
synthetic examination table covers with which I covered the floor (Figure 1/1a/3). I made this decision in
an effort to tie the colors of the entire (total) space together. The floor was a battleship-gray rug which
did not fit with the rest of the piece. Adding the white examination covers served a dual purpose at the
time. They both covered this rug and added a new layer of metaphorical meaning—stemming from
ideas of sterility, the synthetic, disposability and of course, mass-producability and industrialism.
However, they created an even more precarious surface for the milk as the entire surface of the sterile
floor covers generated movement when or if someone ventured a step. While I saw this as a mistake on
my part, a miscalculation for which the meaning of the piece suffered, I realized later that it was this
over-mediation, this attempt to completely totalize the entirety of the space which actually furthered
the ideas which I was attempting to generate. I was participating with the same issues I was trying to
critique—creating an alienating, united activity. Though I knew the hand-written script would visually
signify an attempt toward totalization, failed, the significance of this last attempt to completely unify the
floor with the rest of the piece escaped me at the time. However, the effect it did have as a repellant for
social integration, as a centrifugal grid which kept people at a distance, nevertheless, literally enacted
some of the polarities and tensions I was working with and attempting to examine in epluribusunum.
People were restricted, their behavior and activity policed by objects on an invisible structure, and this
forced a certain amount of distance between them and the center of the exhibition on display.

While I came away from the production of epluribusunum confident in my ability to make material
productions of my aesthetic inquiries and in my ability to activate the dimensionality of spaces in so
doing, I was still harboring a serious concern about how to negotiate commentary versus participation
within an institute on which I was dependent. This piece had not just failed toward its goal of
participation but had transformed the idea of aesthetic objecthood into a theatrical imposition, rather
than a reciprocated experience. The imposition, however, was not from my attempt to impose rules and
structures into the experience of the piece, but rather rested in an area I was overlooking at this
moment of my aesthetic development. The imposition rested on assumptions I made about receptive
agency and capacity: I still labored under the illusion that a certain specificity of meaning needed to be
relayed and was somehow left unknown without the force of my will.
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4
Vivarium(s)
And the Work of Lisa Cartwright
Following an interest in the ways objectivity is subjectively structured and circulated into apparently
objective modes of perception, and the ways in which the limits and character of instrumentation,
whether logical or observational, in fact, inscribe subjectivity with that character and those limits and
thus structure the apparent objectivity it creates, I continued research into etiologies of medicine’s
visual cultures and the processes of observation and implementation of empirical science both historical
and contemporary.

Lisa Cartwright’s book: Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture was central to much of my
work subsequent to epluribusunum and preceding sobject. Following the work of Foucault, Cartwright’s
research uncovers the ways in which “the qualitative and empirical gaze of eighteenth and early
nineteenth-century anatomoclinical perception…”, as Foucault describes it, interpenetrates with the
genealogical roots of late-nineteenth and early twentieth century medical visual culture.40 This
developing history is defined by a relentless analysis and quantitative gaze demonstrated by the early
researchers of the neurological gaze, psychiatric pathology and X-ray technicians. What emerges from
the illuminating research of Cartwright are modes of visual perception and structures that develop first,
through a competitive tension between the subjective anxieties of observers (empiricists competing
with psychoanalysts and the talking cure) and second, and perhaps more profound, through modes of
perception not only generated and structured by technologies of observation themselves, but carefully
“incubated in the laboratories of physiologists and medical scientists”, all of which manifest themselves
in further developed modes of objectivity which traffic in institutions and procedures of “the hospital,
the popular cinema film, the scientific experiment and the modernist artwork.”41

This incubatory and surveillant urge to observe and analyze subjects through, with, and eventually of,
the objects of visual instrumentation led to erasures and alterations in subjects, as the limits and
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character of the objects of observation and analysis emerged. Whether through the failure of
neurologists to understand epilepsy through cinematographic capture, by attempting to ‘draw out
involuntary movement’ or through the public spectacle of a corporately-sponsored electroshock
execution of an elephant filmed at a popular Coney Island attraction; or through optically altered
laboratory rabbits whose ears were implanted with surveillent devices to monitor blood flow, the
instrumentation of visibility, documentation and surveillance itself, was beginning to alter, mutate,
divide and splice organic processes. This was all being developed into an objectified visual culture of
science and medicine often exhibited publicly and associated with modern art, popular culture and film
history.42 A multiplicity of time and volume across, and within, organic processes was being drastically
altered for the benefit of observation itself, and developed into mutations, degenerations and even
masochistic death; which was the case for an X-ray technician who documented his own “skin coming
off in flakes” and yet continued to expose himself to harmful radiation.43 No matter the potential
psychological impulses, these were all ways to create docility, intelligibility and sight, all of which now
bore the nature and limits of the technologies of observation themselves.

The practices of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century medical researchers guided by the
instrumentality of early cinema created vivariums. In these, the character and potentiality of the
camera, microscope or visibility itself, often superseded and over-inscribed, distorted and limited
organic outcomes to the specific nature of the instrumentation of the visual. This was the case in the lab
of the Clarks in which they “surgically produced the condition of transparency in the living body of the
mammal of their choice, the rabbit.”44 Through the implementation of surveillance cameras in the
rabbit’s surgically altered ears “Not only did they breed a colony of rabbits suitable in size and
disposition to their purposes; they surgically altered the animals so that their bodies would exactly suit
their techniques of observation.”45

The idea of a vivarium, in which an apparently natural environment is supposed to develop for the
purposes of observation and study, without reference to the limits and effects of such restriction, took
on an especially heightened significance for my aesthetic inquiries for two reasons. The first had to do
with the concrete historicization of structures of medical perception, which as Foucault had shown and
Cartwright further elucidates, move from their experimental and corporeal realms between the intimacy
of the doctor-patient relationship in secondary spatiality, into the public realms of tertiary spatiality, and
thus into a political and cultural consciousness. The second point of interest had to do with the
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interpolations between this genealogy and that of the movements of modern art. For example, early
creations of medical experimental cinema were often shown in movie theaters prior to ‘features.’ A
fascination with flatness and abstraction in medical visual culture finds concrete examples in genres of
Modern painting, notwithstanding the now popularized exhibition of American Abstract Expressionism,
which toured Europe as an example of American freedom, held against an overt McCarthyism, occurring
at the time. In addition to these concrete examples of the ways in which perceptive structures are
subjectively created and objectified through instrumentation, I was also interested in the ways that
certain notions of an un-historicized institution of art, both prior and subsequent to the work of Peter
Bürger, could be tendered with currencies of polarity between autonomy and social praxis. This arthistorical insularity traffics with similar tensions and with certain instrumental parallels to that of an
autonomously structured vivarium, constructed with certain notions of observation and visibility as its
highest priority.46

Thinking about how social media was developing, with a particular interest in the Facebook and
YouTube phenomena occurring as I was producing this work, I began to conceive ideas about social
vivariums, in which people actively sacrifice privacy and important demographic information at the
expense of perceived individuation and the reproducibility of such. All of this was taking place in the
media frenzy of post-911 America. My interest in the grid shifted from a primarily philosophical and arthistorical concern, to a practical one and I began to think of the grid as more of a concrete social and
cultural structure.
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The first decision I made was to begin
shooting video of track-housing
developments. I was interested in the slowly
moving, evenly truncated and similarly
colored exterior structures, which
contributed to the lived structures taking
place through, of and within. I edited this
footage into recurring loops and projected
them into an installation environment which I
created in a similar way to epluribusunum.
Figure 8: Vivarium; Track Housing Grid

However, I created the space of Vivarium with

more of an emphasis on technology and experimentation. I designed the space to reference both the
modern hospital and the experimental laboratory. As I did in epluribusunum, I covered the bottom third
of the wall with drably colored industrial paint. With stainless-steel handles installed in non-utilitarian
places (Figure5), I installed a damaged exam table into the space, on which I created a number of
organically concocted samples, some of which were
milk from epluribusunum. Vivarium utilized the
industrial design of a hospital or
institution, signified by the painted
lower third of the wall, and the
smooth, sterile, stainless-steel
fixtures. What would normally be
hidden deep within such an
institution or even deeper in the
history of its public artifice, that of
the experimental laboratory space
(Figure 5) was put, in this space, on
public display. On a clipboard, next
Figure 5: Vivarium

to the examination table, I
projected the looped imagery of

the track- housing developments (Figure 8/9). The projection of this footage onto a clipboard, hanging
next to an examination table, was intended to signify two opposing metaphors. The first was an attempt
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for the footage to read like research notes, progress or collected data,
analyzing and assessing the parallel process taking place on the table.
However, after closer examination of the projected image, one quickly
became aware that the image on the clipboard was moving, made of light
and projected from elsewhere and caught in a process of continual
repetition. I saw this as referencing the insular, self-referentiality of a
vivarium, which doesn’t just alter organic processes by the very nature of
its own instrumentation of visibility and observation, but eventually
begins to create its own mutations. Adjacent to the stainless steel exam
table was another sample table on wheels. On this table I placed a
number of organically inspired paintings and drawings. These implied and
Figure 9: Vivarium, Video Loop of
Tracking Houses

a-sembled taxonomies of tracking, tracked-housing developments, and
made direct reference to the limits and nature of the instrumentation of
observation and surveillance. Simultaneously, due to their organic yet

autonomous abstract development, these samples, or subjects, were quite literally only limited by the
collective set of visual signifiers arranged and constructed around them to create the artifice of
observation and instrumentation. The small drawings and paintings, made from organic materials, made
no direct reference to anything outside of the material process of their own creation, yet were situated
as scientific creations of objective fact.

While these aesthetic experiments were central to my discovering a way to incorporate technological
modes of observation and surveillance into a self-referential system, subjectively creating itself, as it
objectified implied social and cultural phenomena into artifice and spectacle, it was not until after a
series of explorations into behavioral science specifically and empiricism generally, that I came to the
central conclusion of sobject. In this installation, people interacted with the space and its objects as they
moved through the space. However, Vivarium still functioned as a process of separation and distant
observation, similar to the ways in which a traditional painting is typically viewed, contemplated or
consumed. This occurred primarily because of the size of the space, which was too small for more than a
couple of people at once to experience.

Unable to concretely solve the problem about how to make critical, yet participatory art, without
imposing, and thus participating with, the same structures and ideas with which I was attempting to
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critique, I moved into a phase of what can be considered postmodern parody. This all-too-common
semiotic choice in contemporary art, by itself and restricted by a lack of alternate solutions or content,
often only punctuates the social and cultural concerns which it parodies. While comedic, and thus
therapeutic to some degree, artistic parody can sometimes laugh its way into a process of tautological
deferral. However, this was a working strategy and not an exhibition strategy, by virtue of having no
other solution. In other words, in order to solve the critico-participatory problems with which I was
pressed, I had to continue to work regardless of whether or not I thought I had a viable solution.

Despite the absence of a current exhibition strategy, which could work toward a participatory yet critical
experience, my research continued as it had begun. I continued to query the various ways that
perceptive structures, and their genealogies, become embodied and thus inscribe themselves into forms
of societal mediation. I worked with a heightened interest in the ways that technology and science,
often subjectively and autonomously structured, yet objectively portrayed, become marketed and
consumed, despite their often invisible, non-reciprocated institutional and corporate interests.47

In an effort to continue my research and my aesthetic production, I began to combine two elements
which I discovered through my research into the Philosophy of Embodiment.48 I began to concretely
explore the instrumentation of science as it relates to the body. I audited a course in Behavioral Science.
The primary topic of the course was behavioral modification and we were taught the basic tools to chart
intensities of behavior over time. The professor encouraged us to implement some of the basic methods
of behavioral modification on ourselves toward some of the minor goals of a healthier life. While helpful
and productive for losing weight or quitting smoking, of most interest to the development of sobject
were the basic methods for observation and alteration. The use of grids, charts, subjective language, and
technologies of observation, were, in fact, the same methods used for working with more complex and
serious behavioral aberrations.

Simultaneously, I came across a contemporary mode of behavioral observation that is used to develop
categorizations and taxonomies of behavior, in medical science and, potentially, as the research of
Foucault and Cartwright shows, for the creation of epistemic developments of perception on a scientific,
cultural and political level.
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Cartwright’s research outlines how an inclination toward abstraction and disinterestedness both draws
parallels between modern art and the etiology of the medical gaze, but also introduces the nature of
instrumentation into objectifications of research. In this process, it is shown that researcher’s
proclivities for visuality, often at the expense of clarity, not only create drastic reductions, alterations
and mutations of life, but have long since been developing a scientific and cultural space of privileged
objectivity through the combinatory effects and affects of the objects of instrumentation and the
subjects of study. The development of the microscope from the single lens apparatus to the triple eye of
cinematographic surveillance, brings to light some of the ways that test-rules of clinical control groups
have, from their inception, been structured by the apparatuses of observation and the subjective
proclivities of researchers. These observers prioritized the clarity of restricted abstraction at the expense
of an organism’s larger processes. As the clarity of detail increased, so too did the distortion of context,
and this was a subjective choice of observers.49 The case of an early X-Ray technician who
masochistically sacrificed his life through a series of exposures he knew was killing him, in order to be
the test-rule for his own research, mentioned above, is perhaps the most morbid and clear example of
the extent to which instrumentation and the subjective drives of researchers concretely effect the
processes of scientific objectification. It also makes clear just how difficult theorizing agency was (and
continues to be) in the development of medical and cultural images. And, in a larger sense, this history
exemplifies just how complex and multivalent agency and reception is for our contemporary society,
with its spectacles, its semblances of exchange and cultural artifice, which it creates and by which it is
created.

5
FACS
The Facial Action Coding System is a contemporary software system designed to empirically analyze and
objectify the nuances of emotion which, by inference, opens up a myriad of potential use by way of
categorization and objectification. While I was intrigued by the mere existence of a company called the
James Long Company for Software and Hardware Solutions for Psycho Physiological Research
(JLCSHSPP), which boasts of a product line with catchy marketable uses for the technology with names
like the Star Search Cognitive Challenge, the Pendulum Smooth Pursuit Eye Movement System and the
EYETRACK Eye Movement Analysis System, I was more intrigued by the list of institutes and universities
on the client list which includes: Harvard University, Cambridge, John Hopkins University and the
Baltimore and New York State Psychiatric Institutes.50
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The Facial Action Coding System is a system utilized to locate and track identity epochs which are
assessed and generated through the observation and attempted codification of facial muscular action.
These actions are coded into Action Units or AU’s, which are tallied and scored together in an effort to
describe facial movement based on the anatomical analysis of facial action. Beyond the potential
implications for social perception and categorization for ideations of health, illness, docility,
unintelligibility and access to health care and insurance, what was most compelling about FACS, with
regard to my aesthetic inquiries, was twofold.

The first thing that interested me was the connection between sight and language. This correlation
which Foucault describes as the primary shift in medical perception at the turn of the eighteenth
century, that of a correlation between the seen and the said, is here as evident as ever attempting to
overwrite something as complex, temporally structured and contextually relative as behavior. All of this
is accomplished in FACS through what can be seen, and thus said and objectified, on the surface of the
face. The power to see, and the instrumentation to analyze, is objectified in a private space of privileged
description.

The second thing about FACS which stirred my aesthetic interest was the way its inventors prescribe the
development of its test-rule against which to judge other subjects. Following the pioneer of FACS’
empirical model, Dr. Hjorstjo (1970), an anatomist interested in the visible manifestations of anatomy,
who apparently learned to ‘fire’ all the muscles in his face separately, Ekman and Friesen spent hours in
front of a mirror training themselves how to ‘fire’ all of the muscles in their faces. When they were
‘certain’ they had the process correct they photographed themselves. Through a constant comparison
with Hjorstjo, they determined the validity of their own analysis. This is the method they recommend
that new users implement, when purchasing FACS software to create their ‘own’ test-rules and
normative expressions, to ‘objectively’ determine others’ normality. This is an overt example of the
ways in which instrumentation and the subjectivity of an observer directly enters into and mutates the
subjectivity of subjects, much like a vivarium. This non-reciprocal inversion of subject and object,
through technologies of surveillance and mediation, is the contemporary outgrowth of both Foucault
and Cartwright’s genealogical research into the structures of cultural perceptions.
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Intrigued and mystified by this corporately marketed and institutionally utilized positive science, I began
material aesthetic experiments, the result of which, as I mentioned above, did not offer much beyond a
process of ironic parody which, while funny, enacted not much more than a series of aesthetic deferrals,
however poignant this research was for the development of my work.

I created my own Facial Action Coding System and developed an alter ego which I called J. Mann, or Jok
(Jacques) Mann. On J. Mann, I implemented a series of absurd behavioral modification regiments. The
basic premise was to use myself as a test-rule. With myself as a test-rule, I literally enacted an analysis
of myself, using metrics created by myself. I created a FACS of my own face (Figure 10). I then tracked
my own invented behavior over time using behavior intensity levels, which I charted using graphs and a
self-referential taxonomy, developed over the course of the whole study. From this process, I created an
entire set of narratives around the subject’s inability to bend to the modification regiment. Most of the
conclusions were based on novel behavior bursts of high intensity in which the subject spurted what the
observers, led by J. Mann, conjectured were rooted in French poetry. Any behavior that proved
problematic for the visible (verbal), or ran counter to previous conclusions, was quickly discarded as
insignificant.

The observers, however, did conduct close readings of written transcriptions (visible), of certain poetic
phrases that the subject would yell, speak and spew. In an effort to parody empirical instrumentation, I
began making alternate graphs which began to create pictures: one clearly rendering a track housing
development with a ©Hallmark sun setting behind it (Figure 11), and another morphing into a parallel
analysis of Jackson Pollock’s Autumn Rhythm (Figure 7). The reference to Jackson Pollock was an
attempt to connect the development of art-history, with its elevation of mythologies of ‘genius’ and
cults of personality, with empirical science and behavioral modification, Jackson Pollack being one of the
most tragically heroic and behaviorally problematic figures of the New York art world prior to Jean
Michele Basquiat.

My own scientific analysis in FACS, directly parodied methods for the multiplication of autonomous
abstractions of subjectively created normative metrics. It was also imitative of the ways in which the
subjectivities of doctors and observers enter the objects of their analysis and create distorted
tautologies and hybrids ad infinitum.
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Figure 6: Behavioral Chart, Jackson Pollock

Figure 10: Facial Action Coding System

Figure 10a: Facial Action Coding System
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Figure 11: Behavioral Chart,© Hallmark

While through my research for these parodies I uncovered some startling information which confirmed,
contemporaneously, much of the research I had conducted about the historical developments of
medical and cultural perceptive structures, aesthetically, they were not germane to my criticoparticipatory goals for reception. While funny, depending on one’s intellectual investment and interest,
these pieces had either one of two aesthetic outcomes. The reception, like that of epluribusunum, but
for completely different reasons, was either one of alienation, because they demanded so much ‘inside’
knowledge, or these pieces fell easily into a categorization related to postmodern parody, which did not
do much else except punctuate issues and concerns most people were not all that concerned with or
surprised by. I began to realize that serious topics, when presented in the context of contemporary art,
are easily over-looked when too densely packed in ironic humor, which all too often comes off as
strident or even nihilistic.
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6: sobject
While preparing for my ‘official’ thesis show, I still faced some of the fundamental aesthetic problems
over which I mulled since I matriculated at RIT. The way I solved the issues of criticality and participation
distinctively mark the significant difference between art and science and underscore how illogic, or
means-end deferment, creates a process by which unforeseen solutions, and thus new paths of thinking,
present themselves. One might legitimately ask: well isn’t this exactly what the history of science and
the development of medical imagery was involved with, toward which you have levied so much critical
analysis? In answering, I would say yes, but what I have been interested in discovering, through this
process of critical engagement, has less to do with the creative processes of scientists and scientific
discovery—I benefit every day from that activity—and more to do with its effacement, or lack thereof.
Sobject is concerned with investigating the non-reciprocated elements that eventually make their way
into the artifice and semblance of objective imagery, and the ways in which outside interests can
circulate these images in spectacles, media and art. Also of interest was the ways that these processes
embody themselves in our contemporary lives.

I should make a distinction between two ways I was viewing and attempting to solve the issues of
participation. I realized two discrete but integrally related problems with regard to participation in the
development of sobject. The first being an issue of methodology, and the second, being an issue of
reception. The first problem, with regard to methodology, was really an issue pertaining to my own
participation with many of the same structures, and within the same set of aesthetic and scientific
criteria, I was seeking to theorize and critically engage with aesthetically. The second problem of
participation with regard to reception, or rather an evolving idea I had in relation to reception, was
stemming from an assumption I was making about an imposed necessity within participation, namely,
that participation had to be a heuristic or allegorical process at all, where the issues with which I was
working had to become evident. The first problem of my own participation, that of methodology, was
stemming from a paradox circulating in the art world since Duchamp’s Urinal, that of how one can make
work that operates under the pretense of criticality, within and of the historicized institutional
structures one seeks to query without, in the end, perpetuating those same issues? As I mentioned in
the introduction to this thesis, there is a certain level of complicity one must accept if one is to work at
all and that doesn’t necessarily have to mean the work loses any of effectiveness. In fact, I had come to
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realize that the problem itself was rather pretentious and assumed two theories of agency integrally
linked to the problem of ‘other’s participation’, or reception, outlined above. First, I assumed I could
control the reception of my work much more than is ever possible, and second, I imagined the issues
and concerns which I was attempting to portray needed to be received, as such, in order to increase
others’ awareness or interest in these structures. Of course, as I have stated above, others are often
much more aware than I, about much more than I, and controlling reception past a certain point is in
reality an impossibility.

With these basic insights in mind, I was able to conceive more clearly that the receptive participation I
was working toward was less a matter of the communication of specific information and more a matter
of creating possibilities of, and through, communication(s)—toward new forms of artifice and
semblance, created through social interaction with the deconstructed language(s) of specifically
communicated artifice and semblance.

I put my proverbial head down and decided to create a process which I hoped would bring the work and
enough of my understanding of it to bare. What inevitably occurred in my attempt to systematize this
process was that I began prioritizing the elements of my work leading up to that point which I
considered successful. I then tried to answer a couple of seemingly simple questions: why were those
elements successful, and based on the answer and their connection to one another, how could I extend
those ideas into an experience where those elements might be recognized, discussed, embraced or
even, and this was the real insight, ignored. This last point is connected to the point made above about
receptive participation, or the participation of others, and is something I have learned several times over
during my artistic and intellectual development, and yet easily lose sight of, and is thus worth
repeating—one cannot control aesthetic reception. No matter how socially motivated or how seemingly
important a message, if one is truly part of a community and interested in strengthening community,
one can only pursue one’s interests as far their sobjective potential. How one sobjectifies beyond a
certain point is what makes producing art important. The subjective remainders imbued in an object,
endeared in a mark or registered in another person’s experience, are no longer the artist’s, but that
which remains to be seen and thus resists certain types of efficiency and teleological reason—following
Adorno’s aesthetic theory: “…identity is the power of non-identity.”51
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In an effort to ‘get back to the basics’, I returned to painting. After a series of starts and stops, I found
myself compelled to make a series of paintings which combined two seemingly similar, but diametrically
different genres of modern painting, color field painting and Minimalism. Color field painting, which
genealogically moves through Brice Marden and Kenneth Noland to Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko,
(mentioning only a few) attempts to make color, usually applied in large-scale fields which extend
outside any singular perceptive periphery, emanate from the canvas in a kind of transcendental, spiritual
connection beyond the object. Whereas Minimalism, stemming from the tradition of Robert Morris,
Donald Judd, Carl Andre, even Frank Stella and Ellsworth Kelly, to some degree, works from a premise
that believes paintings and sculpture are objects in space and cannot (or at least should not) attempt
any reference beyond that fact. Minimalism’s significance comes from relationships with space and
those involved in the experience of reception. By minimizing all interior spatial and illusory reference,
Minimalism heightens the experience between people,
spaces and objects. I am aware that there are various
exceptions, additions and possible objections, to be
argued about my heavy-handed generalizations about
genre. However, I partake in this manicuring of history to
help clarify what I was attempting to accomplish with my
paintings.

In my studio, I imagined the production of these
paintings in terms of narrative perspective. Where a
Color field painter may have been working toward
something like a connection with a fourth dimension,
something spiritual and beyond this world, their position
Figure 12: sobject; Suveillance Painting: Exterior

in the field of American Abstract Expressionism, or its
subsequent generation, meant that these artists first

worked from the perspective of the first person, the ‘I’. While transcendentalism in American painting
was a proposition primarily about reception, art-market authenticity was the currency of the individual,
and as much as anything, as art-institutionally important to the meaning of the objects themselves in
their day. A Minimalist, I imagined, would work primarily from the perspective of the third person, trying
to negate authorship, to enhance objecthood and heighten the spatial relationship with the other, or
the ‘them.’ The ‘they’, the ‘them’, the objects, the space, would be imbued as narrative elements in the
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third person perspective. I was interested in exploring how to make use of these seemingly different
perspectives to create objects and experiences as open as possible for the second person narrative
structure, the ‘you’. While elements of each perspective were of course inevitable, there would be a
‘them’, maybe even some sort of beyond ‘it’, and there would be an element of ‘us’ and somewhat of an
authorial erasure. However, it was this focus on the second person, the ‘you’, that piqued my interest as
I worked toward sobject. It was the possible transition from the second person to the third person
perspective, that I was most interested in, the movement from tertiary spatiality to political
consciousness. However, to work toward a ‘them’ bracketed agency and reception in a way that would
run counter to all of sobject’s development thus far. There, of course, would be a ‘them’ and then an ‘us’
and a ‘we’; but, to get there, I needed to first focus on the ‘you’, which had particular significance to me
in the increasingly more surveillant culture of perpetual terrorism and social media. Time’s person of the
year in 2006 was “You.”

I created a method for producing paintings in which each practical decision and material choice was
made with regard to its effectiveness toward heightening the presence of the second person
perspective. I imagined that producing an experience in which the second person perspective was
elevated, enhanced and prioritized, would complicate and multiply, the historically typified, means-end
logic, of the painting genres I was semiotically employing. These could be re-corded and re-ported as unautonomous illusions and artifices. In this environment these paintings could be read as permeable
semblances and become experienced as malleable ontic elements in an epistemological, historical
process.

The format and size of the paintings would be critical to producing this combinatory extension of both
color field painting and Minimalism. My decision was to produce these paintings in a typical portrait
format, rather than how I imagined a color field painter would work in a landscape format, the edges of
which extending beyond one’s visual periphery. Instead of using color to gesture toward the
transcendental, by employing an intense, complementary color transition, or by filling the color field
with bright or loud colors, which would emanate beyond the material objectivity of the painting, I was
drawn to the mass-produced, muted, color samples for home exteriors in Home-Depot. Informed by a
continued exploration of track-housing developments, and the metaphorical use of color in
epluribusunum and Vivarium, I chose the monochromatic, repetitious colors of these housing
developments for the production of these paintings.
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Following in the tradition of Minimalism, I wanted the objecthood and the material of the paintings to
be dominant components in their exhibition. To heighten this, I built deep wooden structures which
came nearly three inches off the wall. In addition to this, I determined that the surfaces had to be
completely smooth. Any imperfection would gesture toward an internal relation and begin to create
illusionistic space which would threaten the objecthood and shape of the painting. In order to reference
the second person as clearly as possible, I elected to take great care to ensure that the surface was
reflective, but not glaring or alienating. Through many layers of epoxy, poured paint, and several final
layers of urethane, the paintings began to refract their layered color outward, while simultaneously
absorbing their surroundings, just enough to, in-turn, reflect, or rather express, their surroundings
through the muted monochrome colors, which simultaneously refracted the character of the object. The
paintings became interchangeable portraits of the act of reception itself—sobjects. This was
accomplished through a careful balance of surface reflection and objective absorption, furthering the
classic ‘push-pull’ methodologies, in the history of abstraction, beginning in Hans Hoffman’s studio.52 I
made two of these monochromatic field paintings which I considered successful. I judged their success
by their ability to both absorb and express the reception of the painting, while definitively reflecting the
viewer(s) and thus, like the genealogies of anatomoclinical perception, the visual culture of medical
perception, and the autonomous test-rules of FACS, structured the experience of reception with the
character of observational instrumentation and by the act of aesthetic participation. Unlike these
historical genealogies and the contemporary, corporate methods in which perceptive structures make
their way from primary configuration into political consciousness, I wanted the terms to be reciprocal.
However, the paintings, by themselves, hanging in traditional fashion on the gallery wall to be
traditionally consumed, would not be enough to achieve the above mentioned outcome, which I
theorized would be the real success of sobject, if any could be achieved. While they read as surveillance
paintings because of the way they registered and created their own process of reception, the
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relationship was far from reciprocal in this form alone. No
concrete or practical mode of participation was being
implied or offered. These paintings, as they were, would just
be passed by as somewhat shiny, rarified objects.

I referred to these paintings as surveillance paintings early
on because, while they demanded observation as paintings,
they simultaneously observed the viewer. Through their
expression of a reflected transformation in reception, not
yet clearly reciprocated by the observed, the paintings, in
essence, watched while being watched. Viewer’s images
were reflected back to them as somewhat distorted,
flattened, abstracted copies of human life, truncated from
Figure13: sobject, Surveillance Painting Reproduced

the organic cycles of multidimensional difference. This
directly referenced the ways in which visual instrumentation

and subjective experimentation come together to construct modes of objective visual perception, which
all of my research so far had punctuated.

I decided to pursue ways to make the surveillant character of these paintings more pronounced so that
the viewer’s interaction entailed an awareness of the ways the paintings were observing, being
observed, and projecting reception. This activity paralleled the history of the medical gaze, which
structured reception, through a similar interactive process. I elected to literally make these paintings
surveillance paintings.

Placing a small security camera on top of the paintings both enhanced their status as surveillant objects,
and thus, heightened an awareness for the non-reciprocated, more covert and subtle ways, the
paintings complicated and multiplied capture, absorption, distortion and reflection (Figure14). Because
they were now overtly surveillant their character, as both reflective and absorptive objects, became
much more evident. In addition to this added clarity and focus, achieved through the dialectic between
the surface character of the paintings and their camera crowns, the literal placement of the camera on
the paintings now made the relationship between subject and object, viewer and painting, and the
multiplicity of reception, somewhat more reciprocated. All the terms were clarified, as the inherent
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tensions between their separate elements
raised their reception to a new critical level.
The paintings were literal surveillance
machines, so if one chose to interact with
them, it was despite and perhaps in spite of
this obvious process. The experience
became a participatory collaboration
worked out in the reciprocal mediation of
subject and object, of sobjects.

In conjunction with these monochrome
Figure 14: sobject, Close-up of Security Camera

surveillance paintings, I was interested in
creating a larger system in which

observation and its technologies were put on display as first, elements of sobjective creation and
second, as implied but inevitably non-autonomous objective records of such sobjective creation, and
lastly, to put them on display in a way which would produce an interactive experience with regard to
reception. I was methodically trying to integrate a constructed semblance, of aesthetic objects, merged
with the technology of observation itself. I was essentially interested in producing an aesthetic
experience structured by a process through which aesthetic objects are constructed and circulated as
public image and objectified into something like truth in semblance, artifice and objectivity.

In addition to Foucault’s work in The Birth of the Clinic, particularly the movement from primary
configuration through political consciousness, outlined above, Foucault’s genealogy of the birth of the
prison and in particular the panopticon gives the work of the Birth of the Clinic a particular poignancy.

…”Discipline” may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of
power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques,
procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an “anatomy” of power, a
technology. 53
The panopticon, designed by eighteenth century philosopher and social reformist Jeremy Bentham was
planned to be, above all else, a structure, an early technology of surveillance. It was designed as an
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inversion of the typical dungeon structure, of depth and darkness, as a structure of
compartmentalization, light and visibility. In essence, each prisoner, patient or schoolboy would be held
in a single cell, as part of a larger series of cells, which were ordered in a large ring on the outer wall of
an architectural structure. In the center of the annular cells was an observation tower in which were
situated, in non-visibility, observers. Each cell was backlit by a single window rendering all movement
and activity inside each cell visible by observers, who through a series of truncated and angled walls,
were never in view to the prisoners. Through what Foucault terms panoptocism, what was intended as a
physical structure, became a modern condition of discipline par-excellence. Through panopticism, a
process which Foucault asserts develops simultaneously into the development of disciplines which have
as their goal to “ …increase the particular utility of each element of the multiplicity, but by means that
are the most rapid and the least costly, that is to say, by using the multiplicity itself as an instrument of
growth,” the very possibility of observation, within the modern panoptic structure, began to supersede
actual observation, and functioned as a self-policing mechanism through which types of power could
mobilize into the bio-powers of individual responsibility, docility and every-day behavior. This selfpolicing, because of the possibility of observation, was of particular interest to my work. It describes the
concrete, biological, physical outcome of a non-reciprocated process of observation, abstraction and
flattening, the interests of which, obscured by the necessity toward further objectification, power and
subjective mutations develop into and through, the forces of conciliation.

When I first set a security camera on top of the monochrome paintings it was un-plugged from any
monitor and only symbolically represented true surveillance; however, I was struck by the fact that it did
not matter if these paintings were, in fact, recording or not. Like the invisible observers in the
panopticon, the very possibility that the camera was observing had the same effect and produced a
similar affect. This was due primarily to the covert purpose generally associated with surveillance. The
cameras are sometimes in sight, but rarely does one have the benefit of witnessing footage, unless, of
course, it is being used to create a public spectacle, a public semblance of law and order, or as a
prosthetic eye, in medicine.

The work of Steve Mann whose wearable surveillance apparatuses reverse the terms of classical nonreciprocated surveillance was of particular interest at this time in sobject’s creation.54 He advocates the
wearing of his overt surveillance clothes and objects through airports and in public spaces. The footage,
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like that of what I am calling classical surveillance, is hidden. The activity he implores signifies an
alteration, a diversion of power. The nodes, outposts and centers of institutional, corporate and state
surveillance are frustrated and complicated, designed to signify the capture and relinquishment of a
certain type of institutionalized power, exemplified and inscribed into public behaviors and structures.
In addition, he captures and collects data about, and within, surveillant environments.

Like Mann, I was interested in exploring ways to signify and inevitably enact a re-appropriation of the
apparatus of surveillance to be put to an alternate use for a social, participatory experience. The
placement, use and visibility of footage seemed central to clearly making this re-appropriation evident,
and thus approachable, as a form of active engagement. However, the idea of just handing people
cameras and asking them to film each other publicly, with the footage on display, didn’t work for
sobject. I needed to bring the apparatuses of observation into close relation with the structures from
which I imagined I was appropriating them, so that the process of re-appropriation was more
pronounced and enhanced. This was why I was building cameras into objects. Doing this in a system
populated by art-historical objects, which carried with them parallel histories of institutionalization and
that of surveillance culture, was a way of enhancing this relationship, which, in turn, was designed to
explore, emphasize, alter, complicate and multiply these parallels. This would also heighten an
awareness of the systemic process from which the second person perspective is constructed, in relation
to, and in the process of, this re-appropriative act. The second person perspective, in fact, could begin to
structure and control the instrumentation of observation in a way that those same instruments, in their
previous system, were structuring and attempting to control the second person perspective.
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As the idea of building cameras into the
objects of sobjects developed, I needed to
solve what to do with the monitored
footage. I began to explore the various ways
that the monitors of the surveillance I
wanted to take place could be displayed
Figure 15: sobject, Monitored Footage

along with the monochrome surveillance
paintings. I first thought a formal

presentation of the monitors on a pedestal, directly next to the paintings, made the clearest work of the
idea(s) I was trying to present. However, I was given the opportunity by Dr. Thomas Lightfoot to exhibit
my work for an open-house taking place in the Art Department. This allowed me to analyze these
paintings’ public reception by surveying the ways in which people interacted with them publicly. In
anticipation of this opportunity, I decided to experiment with another, equally formal but drastically
different mode to incorporate the monitors and their respective footage, into the reception of the
paintings.

I hung the surveillance paintings across from one another, exploring the ways they might observe each
other in an implied autonomous loop. I placed the monitors in the center of the gallery space facing
each other, again trying to emphasize the autonomous process I imagined I was creating. When people
entered the space, I observed them working together to uncover exactly how, if, and by which angle,
they were being surveyed. Once they figured it out they began to ape at the devices, making faces and
interacting in ways that challenged discipline and docility. Witnessing them work together to first,
critically unravel the source of observation and second, actively and playfully enact behavior determined
to undermine social codes of discipline and docility, offered a solution to the question of how to make
critical, yet participatory, aesthetic experiences about the issues of instrumentational perceptive
production. This participatory interaction, in the reception of these early pieces, created a space where
these modes, made obvious, could be subjectively and actively re-appropriated, essentially reappropriating affect, and re-creating their effect, which in our technologically structured lives is always
in a constant state of sobjective flux. This was a reciprocal mode of surveillance, which countered
traditional assumptions about its role in the subjective lives of people and began to transfigure into a
delicate balance between the objective lives of subjects, in view, and the imbued subjective nature of
objects of analysis and observation; this is sobject(ivity).
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In addition to creating a process of surveillant re-appropriation, I wanted to explore ways to display the
multi-dimensionality of semblance and artifice. I was interested in finding a way to make it evident that
images, objects and their respective structures, while certainly utilized as artifices of power and
attempted representation, are not mutually exclusive with reality but form physical, individual and
collective forms of sobjectivity. They are, in fact, an integral part of the process of sobjectivity and
through an active and reciprocal engagement, become just as important for the varying potential of
cultural, social and political change, closer to the figurative and literal ground.55

The work of the contemporary artist Franz
West played an important role in the next
set of decisions which I implemented for
sobject. West is a complex and fascinating
Viennese artist whose breadth of thought
and production do not have a fair chance
at a proper treatment in these pages.
However, his work’s “intermediate position
between an autonomous work of art and
an object of use,” his lineage to the
Figure16: sobject, Bench- Studio View

Viennese Actionists and his work’s

relationship with psychoanalysis, were three areas in which my own work and research resonated.56
West often designs, makes, and installs ‘furniture pieces’ which are intended to be both aesthetic
objects and utilitarian objects. He also explores the surface texture of objects to create tangible
relationships between the body and the object on which, or against which, the body rests or grasps.
Form is also another area in which West attempts to reinvent against the backdrop of historical genre
and reception. His sculptures are often grotesquely formed and roughly textured, making metaphorical
and semiotic nods to certain idealities of form, yet suggesting something else. To further complicate and
multiply tensions between the ideal and the material, he frames his work rhetorically in metaphoric
language which can be connected to Platonic ideality. For instance, he submits as his artist statement for
the anthology Art Now the following: “Take a chair off the shelf use it for its purpose then put it back
again.”57 The furniture and couches he produces often recall Freudian repose and gesture toward
psychoanalysis, a field in which West is known to have conducted extensive study.
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Influenced by West’s furniture pieces and by Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle, in which he posits
that reality is in fact becoming more and more separated from people by the proliferation of simulacra, I
began to work toward the next layer of sobject.58 Motivated by an exploration into artifice, image and
semblance, I decided to have one of the monochrome surveillance paintings professionally
photographed and printed in the exact dimensions of the painting, in essence producing an exact
simulacrum of the painting. During this process, I began to explore ways I could further enhance the
objecthood of the paintings by assigning them a utilitarian purpose. With a nod to Italian Art-Povera, I
purchased four cinder blocks and placed a painting over the blocks (Figure 16/17 &Figure A). In addition,
I placed an orange, pleather cushion across the center of the painting. This cushion with its color and
material signified mid-twentieth century design and brought with it a semiotic milieu of late-modernism.
The addition of this cushion essentially produced a bench or a makeshift couch. At first, this was a
painful proposition because I had worked diligently to get the surface quality to balance between
absorption and reflection and people seated on it would inevitably damage the surface. However, the
ideas of the work superseded my personal need to rarify the object. By placing the exactly replicated
and reproduced image of the painting on the wall in front of the bench/couch, itself created by the
object the image was representing, I accomplished a myriad of significance which was central to sobject.
(Figure A)

Figure 17: sobject; Monitored Bench
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The process of making a bench/couch from a painting, essentially putting autonomy to use, both
referenced the privileged field of autonomy and its multiple historical developments in art-history,
science and culture, but simultaneously heightened the impossibility of complete autonomy without any
social praxis. There is nothing more practical than a bench, nothing more non-useful than a couch. And I
can think of no better use for an object of leisure (a painting) than as a bench or couch. In addition, it
enacted a sobjectively constructed process, by which to re-appropriate gestures toward total objectivity,
created through non-reciprocated processes of autonomy, to the sobjectivity from which it was always
being produced. Sobject was beginning to systematize a kind of divergence of the logical process
represented by modern abstraction and enacted most concretely in the history of anatomoclinical
mediation. It was beginning to become a process whereby the typical visibility of biological processes,
abstracted, compared, distorted, flattened, multiplied and removed from their corporeal loci and
represented by a sign in tertiary classification and spatialization, decomposing the human subject in the
realm of public consciousness, was now being re-appropriated from the resulting pruned image of this
process, for the expansion of sobjects. This was occurring through an active distortion of the objective
attempts, evident in the process of representation and mediation itself, on which the literal derriere
would be placed.

This reciprocal utilization of signs and representations of the objects involved, moving toward
representation, are here turned into the very structure on which the body rests, observes, reposes and
dreams, completely aware of the process and actively engaged, disengaged or indifferent, despite and in
spite of the everyday realities of the image of spectacle.

With what I saw as the beginnings of a process for the re-appropriation of certain types of artifice,
semblance and surveillance, transformed into a material experience, and building on what I saw as the
surveillant deferral which had as its receptive telos participation and engagement (people working
together to discover and resist classical modes of non-reciprocated observation), I was now faced with
how to transfer these ideas into the final exhibition of sobject. I began to experiment with ways to
heighten and clarify the ideas that were now emerging as I worked on separate elements of sobject
which would eventually make their way into the exhibition experience.

Another recurring theme, connected generally to ideas in Adorno and Horkheimer and the thrust of the
Enlightenment’s attempt to master nature, and Romanticism’s fixation with becoming nature, was the
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landscape. I had worked with empty landscapes of apocalyptic images of open space since my
undergraduate years. I used an image of a barren, open expanse of space, rendered romantically, as
both a sign of expressionistic potential, but also as an ironic gesture toward the impossibility of mastery
over nature, and with it subjectivity, through instrumentality. Like the simulacrum of the monochrome
painting, turned couch, I began making copies of
landscapes on clear transfer paper, which accentuated
their synthetic nature and reproducibility, but also, like
the monochrome surveillance paintings, captured,
reflected and expressed the image of reception. The
clear plastic transfer paper was semi-glossy, and thus
reflected and absorbed the act of reception. I was also
experimenting with packaging material as I did in
epluribusunum. Like the display shelves in epluribusum,
I was interested in taking disposable objects, designed
and reproduced for packaging, and transforming them
Figure 19: sobject; Order to Perform Alternative Service

into a form historically mediated by ideas of

permanence and authenticity. I was also interested in the parallel between packaged forms of
represented mediation and the literal material of packaging.

While I was experimenting with packaging materials, I was purchasing and implementing several more
surveillance cameras, which I planned to implement into the exhibition of sobject. I also began collecting
pieces and parts of track-housing developments, which I had not yet decided how, or even if, I would
implement into sobject. In an effort to re-investigate the grid and how it might relate to sobject, I
uncovered an older grid painting. Interestingly, in this grid-painting, I used similarly muted,
monochrome grays, to that of my track-house investigations, with which I painted the surveillance
paintings (Figure 20). I also understood that if I was to truly produce an experience which enacted an
appropriative process of artifice and semblance, transfigured sobjectively, and thus materially, into
everyday life, which would simultaneously produce a reciprocal participation with the objects and
technologies of observation and instrumentation, then there had to be a linguistic component, given
language’s central position in the production of any meaning, visual or otherwise.
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Order to Perform Alternative Service (OPAS)
Animated, to some degree, by what I saw as a necessary irony of producing art-institutionally sanctioned
work, inherently imbued with a codified self-negation, apparent in the institution of art since the
appropriation of Duchamp’s ready-mades, I began exploring a book of federal defense codes.59 The Book
of Federal Codes and Regulations of the Department of Defense became a metaphor of a specific
discipline and practice for the production of sobject. I did have to defend my thesis, but the book also
emanated with a multiplicity of significance, from connections to our own society’s militarized middleeastern excursions, through the book’s literal use as a mode to mediate, discipline and control,
institutional and state behavior. I found a section called: Order to Perform Alternative Service (OPAS),
which was particularly significant in the context of the history of an institutionalized Avant-Garde and
the history of a parallel institutionalism of Critical Theory, which also sometimes carried with it a
propensity for negation, a perpetual deferral of positive science, and a presumptuous attitude toward
class capacity.60 I thought the literal act of ordering the right to perform an alternative service, within
this context, was considerably poignant considering my goals toward aesthetic participation and an
apparent complicity. In addition to this level of significance, I was also drawn to this text because it was
literally a text, and thus a technology from which certain types of order were expected to emanate.
Specifically, the word “order,” and the ways it signified both a demand and a structure, were of
particular importance to my choice to include this text in sobject. The demand or “order” for alternative
service was connected to what I Imagined as the re-appropriative process I was trying to create within,
and through, art and scientifically historical structures of mediation and perception. That such a process
could have a demand attached to it was also an interesting irony in itself. But beyond these
connections, the simple word “order” also denoted structure in language, of language, and thus signified
the ways in which reason or means-end logic, critically engaged by Max Horkheimer and Adorno,
attempts, but inevitably fails to totally “order” and control human sobjectivity.61 In addition, the work
of Foucault clearly historicizes the variously concrete ways in which human subjectivity is reordered,
mutated, degraded and combined with structures of power and discipline, creating non-reciprocated
sobjects in the prisons, clinics, hospitals, and institutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
and continues to work today in more microscopic, bio-powered “orders.”

Without veering into a deconstructivist deferral, suffice it to write that the epistemological purity of
something like deconstructivism, while useful as an illustration of an enactment of a temporary
resistance to the above mentioned issues at-hand, was very interesting to me at the time of sobject’s
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production, but anything ‘deconstructive’ in sobject was intended semiotically, as was the handwritten
neologism epluribusunum in that installation. However, each to opposite ends. The aborted attempt to
totalize the surface of the clouds in epluribusunum signified the failed attempt of reason, through its
instrumental construction language, to totalize human subjectivity whereas the deconstruction of Order
to Perform Alternative Service signified the opposite extreme: the continual deferral of deconstruction,
which subordinates anything like ‘the possible’ to oppositions between truth and falsity. Anything which
ventures outside of epistemology to solve problems, will always be subject to ‘metaphysical closures.’
Language games are in fact the slippery material through which we live, but closure is necessary to solve
pragmatic problems.62 It was in the second person, in the ‘you’ of the experience of sobject, that sense
would be made from deconstructed Order and thus, reconstructed ‘order.’ In an attempt to break the
officially capitalized language of Order to Perform Alternative Service from its structure, I rearranged the
words and morphemes of the text into a re-ordered text:
Local
board juri(e)s diction
Order any
non reg
ists
Re straint
whohas been class
ed if
eyed in form alter (n)
arritive sir
(name a)
vice
at
a
Tobe
Tomb
pec
if eyed sbpy
service
alternative
ector dire décor
Board order: reg ists
straint
Re- Formper tern al a
tive
time in
when red ord or Re
corded un-less un-post oned
the re-cord
can re the port
Guard-Less
time under stances less scum
under stance fails to ant muc
then under port re-cord rep
Form altered natives
Local
Boards uty do to alter native
theater. Be is a tin uing con
thereafter.

Without taking part in a complete close-reading of this fractured text of sobjectivity in extremis, I will
point out, through an abridged close-reading, a couple of the salient ways I purposefully reordered this
text and try to clarify why. I re-ordered this text to highlight a process that shifts after the centered
term: “Guard-Less,” signifying the critical participatory attempt being made by sobject to re-appropriate
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something like the non-reciprocated relationship between ‘a guard’ (an object) and its subjects
(reception). I also tried, to the best of the text’s ability, to highlight or separate contexts in which
references to sight and visibility took on particular significance with regard to institutionalized structures
of perception and sight. For example: “eyed” is in the context of an implied “sbpy service” or easily
construed as spy service, which “pec”s at one or might be impeccable. Understanding is reduced to a
stance, possibly calling attention to the relative nature of understanding and knowledge, while the
record, as in a record of something or the act of recording, is restructured in the context of “re” “cords”
and “ports,” possibly implying that something like the act of recorded knowledge has to do with access
to “ports” or centers of “corded” knowledge, and the structured transference of the modes (cords)
through which such knowledge is gathered, structured, mediated and ultimately shared, if at all. Also
the “re” ing of “cords” or, in this context, modes of structure, mediation and transfer, signify a definitive
possibility to “re” “order” these “ports” and “cords” through first, an act of rupture in the logic and
language of re-cording to produce new connections and structures of re-cord from the non-reasonable
process of “alter” ing “Boards” and “juries” of “Diction” and secondly, re-cording and re-ordering modes
of non-reciprocated surveillant mediation. Also, the last three lines: “Boards uty do to alter native/
theater. Be is a tin uing con/ thereafter” take on a particular significance with regard to a theatrical
tension in the recent history of the institutionalized Avant-garde and critical theory in which the two
artists Bertoldt Brecht and Antonin Artaud represent two different, and often competing, theories of
experience. Artaud advocated the complete annihilation of theater by attempting to transfer the drama
of the theater into everyday life, through modes of shock and action by the audience. Brecht, on the
other hand, advocated a different kind of negation of theater through the perpetual use of theater. He
structured performance in a way as to call attention to the artifice and constructed nature of theatrical
production. Working with historical allegory, juxtaposed by the inequalities of current life, Brecht hoped
to inspire an awareness which might transform passive spectatorship into political action. While both
playwrights attempted to use the logic of theater to negate the theater, they also assumed passivity was
present in the spectator. Against the obvious fears of war and Fascism both assumed a drastic reduction
of the receptive capacities of everyday people, whom they sought to emancipate through theater.

So “Boards” here attempting to “alter” “native” “theater” both refers to an institutional alteration of
subjects through objective mediation, but also “Boards” here can refer to the existence of some ideas of
art-institutionalized totality, economic and cultural over-determinism, and assumptions about receptive
capacity or incapacity. That “Be” can be or might be “a tin uing con/ thereafter” as in a con or false63

consciousness, for instance, both references the alterations, distortions and mutations of observational
instrumentation, but also could reference the contradictory nature of an institutionalized Avant-Garde
and criticality which has not yet completely re–“ordered” its “cords.”63

While I understand that this reading is idiosyncratic ad absurdum and perhaps, at worst, just another
attempt to impose a highly specific ‘Order’ into reception, this would only be the case if I expected
others to receive the specific meaning and (un)meaning(s) I have outlined here. I did not. I wanted
meaning to occur in the second person and thus, while it may appear I have labored over the specific
semiotics of this sobjective, deconstructive enactment, this is just one way among many that meaning
can be made.

OPAS was a central component to sobject as a symbol of the process by which text, language and images
circulate to create meaning and help to construct artifice and semblance. I have also included the text
above as a concrete example of the way a text-object is permeated by white space and works as a visual
metaphor for one way the sobjective process between objects and subjects might look at a microscopic
level—permeable, punctured, in continual engagement, affording each other power and representation
depending on the ways in which ‘ports’ are ‘ordered.’
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To further multiply the potential for meaning, I
created an audio-loop of Order to Perform
Alternative Service which repeated continuously
throughout the experience of sobject. I placed
the book of Federal Codes and Regulations on a
pedestal open to the page on which Order to
Perform Alternative Service was printed (Figure
19/21). The pedestal was placed across from a
grid painting I had painted two years prior,
mentioned above, which utilized the similar
Figure 20: sobject; Projected Video Loop; OPAS

monochromatic gray colors of the surveillance
paintings. Onto the surface of the grid, I

projected a looped video of myself reading the Order to Perform to Alternative Service. However, I
altered the video dramatically. I created several
transparent layers of the same footage, looped
over the top of one another. These were timed
with a slight difference from one another, blurring
my identity drastically, but not eliminating it, while
integrating my identity with the grid structure of
the painting. This essentially fused specific identity
with a structure of objectivity, the grid. I chose to
place this at the entrance of sobject because the
Figure 21: sobject; Federal Codes and Regulations; OPAS

literal “order” for, and of, alternative service or
aesthetic experience, was at the heart of what I

imagined sobject to be. While people entered, they were faced with this image morphing, disintegrating
and blending with a monochrome grid and confronted by the sound of a looped recording of the text of
OPAS. The placement of OPAS at the entrance of sobject created a situation whereby one was
immediately affected by this process and carried that affect with them into the experience of the rest of
sobject. When ‘you’ came to the pedestal on which the material text of Order to Perform Alternative
Service was placed, an immediate comparison with what ‘you’ saw, what ‘you’ heard and what ‘you’
thought was said, was enacted. This referenced the fundamental connection between the seen and the
said (and the written) which Foucault outlines. This process of comparative reading mirrored private
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modes of deciphering objective words, as ‘you’ reads in relation to the layered textual and visual
information continually circulating in society, over which so much corporate competition occurs for the
spaces of ‘your’ cognitive processes. ‘You’ are here faced with deciphering an experiential palimpsest,
literally created by the book on the pedestal, the sound of OPAS looping, and the image of the projected
video loop. It is through this sobjective process of deciphering experiential palimpsests through
engagement with linkages between text, sound and image, that we encounter our world, with its
increasingly monitored nodes of commercial repose, rest-stops in information traffic, and predictability.
It is through this complex process of inter-subjectivity that artifice, semblance and image occur. How
one structures these nodes of mediation, has to do with the ways the “cords” are ordered and
transferred into “ports.” Text drastically effects vision and vision drastically effects the way we write
sight. In this way, I considered sobject much like a living organism, never finished, always changing in a
second person, through its connections and relations with the first person, in the social engagement and
creation of the third.

The final form in which sobject, the exhibition, developed was a departure from what is traditionally
thought of as aesthetic form. For sobject, form was a matter of human interaction, involved in a process
imitating certain aspects of our technological and aestheticized society, in order to create spontaneous
and unforeseen subjective positions within this process.

I knew I wanted to multiply the process I saw taking place in the original exhibition of the surveillance
paintings, that of people working together to decipher, participate and inevitably re-appropriate, the
processes of observation and surveillance. In order to accomplish this, I devised a system by which no
single person would be able to see their own image on a monitor, as they became systematically aware
that they were being mechanically surveyed and observed. The object one faced and the object into
which its form drew ‘you’ would always be deferring the image of the observed elsewhere. Much like
the panopticon, I hid some cameras (Figure 22) and left some cameras visible and in-turn, hid monitors
in places to be discovered. To further extend this process of deferral and divergent visibility, I
incorporated mirrors on imaginary grid structures.
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No one, alone, was able to completely see themselves in a monitor—a slice or a part of themselves
might become visible, but not their
identifying features. However, through a
process of social collaboration and planning,
people could easily discover the source and
structure of the surveillance taking place. In
order to organize this system in a way that
would move people through various nodes
of reception and deferred visibility, capture
and re-capture, I needed to build many
small enclosures, nooks, orifices and
implement several mirrors (Figures
Figure 22: sobject; Orifice, Camera Landscape

22/23/24/25). It was into these that people
would be compelled to look. I began to

Figure 23: sobject; Landscape Expressing

create display units which, as the
surveillance paintings did, both absorbed
and expressed reception (Figure 23). I
worked with packaging material of different
types to make forms onto which and into
which I either hid cameras and monitors, or
made it seem as if cameras and monitors
were contained. I incorporated the semitranslucent images of empty landscapes into
and onto these structures, to reference both
the open space for potential and failure to
contain, simultaneously. I was particular
drawn to the effect of these landscapes in

the context of the visual instrumentations of sight, because they directly referenced our inability to
capture, contain and own Nature and with it, human sobjectivity, through these same modes of
instrumentation. In addition, they inevitably expressed the image of ‘one-observing’, which is always
packed into the (s)objective image of containment. In other words, we often construct our own images
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into and onto what exists beyond us, and yet, is often mediating
us. I tried to align the empty centers of these images directly at
the vanishing point of sight, equating the process of looking to
the probing process of capture and containment. In the act of
looking-in, one would inevitably be faced with the expression of
their own image in reception, fusing the second person narrative
Figure 24: soject; Gutter

with this process of looking, capture and instrumental distortion.

Out of an old landscape painting done in the tradition of Richard Diebenkorn, I fashioned a shelving unit,
again enacting a process of abstracted representation, turned utilitarian object. On this shelf, I mounted
a gutter piece from a track house. In the gutter, I placed a camera which projected its surveyed image
directly behind anyone looking into the gutter (Figure 24/25). The object of the gutter protruding off the
shelf was both humorous and compared the probing act of un-reciprocated observation and
examination to that of a phallus. Placed directly at eye level, in the context of continually deferred
surveillance images, people could not resist the urge to look into or down the gutter.

I began to incorporate fluorescent lighting into sobject for its
multiple semiotic purchases (Figure 26). It represented the
bright lighting necessary in experimental medical labs and
clinics. However, I left the constructed and rigged nature of
sobject’s lighting open and prominently displayed. To
highlight this rigged quality, I frayed wires and left
connections exposed, also making reference to the
constructed nature of inputs and outputs, ‘ports and cords,’
Figure 25: sobject; Guy Looking Down the Gutter

light and darkness. The lights emanated with the same bright

glow and buzz of electric signs, which carried packaging and representational connotations. Another
element that intrigued me about the fluorescent lights was the way they emanated and how the light
refused and resisted containment. In an idiosyncratic way, I imagined the light from these fluorescent
bulbs as something like charged subjective remainders, imbued into and onto forms, in which they
inevitably alter, change and transform, in a parallel process with light.
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Continuing to explore the probing, sexualized
nature of looking, clearly illuminated by
Cartwright’s research into the primal urges of
early doctors and clinicians, and their obsession
with disciplining and analyzing the feminine body,
I began to explore other psychoanalytic semiotic
potential in sobject. I produced what I considered
a drawing, in the tradition of Richard Tuttle, out
of packaging materials. I incorporated fluorescent
Figure 26: sobject; Gutter

lights, mirrors, screws and cords. In so doing, I
created what looked like a corporeal figure, lit
from behind by uncontained light, which as I have
mentioned, I attached particular significance with
regard to failed attempts at containment and
complete discipline. Through the ‘body’ or the
‘skin’ of this object, I made an incision through
which one could see light and a mirror which, once
further investigated, reflected the receptive act of
probing and looking(Figure 27).

Underneath the object, I placed mirrors. Over
Figure 28: sobject; Figure Drawing

these mirrors, I ‘drew’ with the literal ‘cord’, which
plugged this light or uncontained subjectivity, into
the ‘port’ of the outlet (Figure 29). The ‘cord’
multiplied and integrated with the reflected
images of those looking, signifying the reciprocal
culpability of reduced, packaged and transferred
structures of observation and mediation, which as
this piece was literally performing, connected the
internal eminence of subjectivity, or in this case,
light, to ports, centers, outlets and inlets. This

Figure 27: sobject; Figure Drawing; Close-up

process mirrored the movement in Foucault from
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primary configuration through political consciousness. The addition of the mirrors, throughout sobject
was an attempt to create and reference the re-appropriative act of producing meaning in the second
person perspective.

The exhibition of sobject was structured with an
interior space and an exterior space. All of the
pieces in which I created protrusions to discover
cameras, monitors, reflected deferments of the
process of reception, and images of ‘you’, were
installed in the interior sections of the space. This
further signified interiority being objectified
through sobjective manipulation in instrumentation
in an effort to create exteriority. Following Franz

Figure 29: sobject; Ground Mirror under Figure Drawing

West’s hyperbolic mutations of traditional sculptural form, I further elaborated with packaging
Styrofoam and shipping crates, to construct the forms into, onto, behind and under which the various
monitors, cameras, simulacra of landscapes, and mirrors would be installed. I attempted to challenge
traditional, symmetrical, efficient, formal solutions in an effort to enact ‘alternative’ formal service, but
also in an effort to highlight the temporal contingency of form with overtly constructed, teetering and
seemingly barely balanced objects. Much like the baby-bottle liners, which were precariously balanced
by the weight of their own volume, these teetering and top-heavy constructions were being ‘held’ or
produced by their precarious nodes and positions of mediation, reception and re-reception, essentially
gaining the ontic weight of their volume by a reciprocal encounter between producing and being
produced (Figure 37/38). I did not want to make these disposable packaging crates and Styrofoam
transform into ideations of permanence. I needed to use them to create display structures, which, as
with the instrumentation of observation and analysis did, perpetuated their characters in appropriated
sobjectivity.

This was all devised into a system which perpetually observed and reflected, distorted and flattened the
artifice and semblance of observation into, and through, a structure of perpetual deferral. This was
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devised so that the sources of instrumentation and
observation could be first discerned, then reappropriated, through a process of social integration
and working together. These pieces were installed in
the interior space of sobject. While pieces in the
system which overtly acted as non-reciprocated
surveillance apparatuses remained outside and,
hopefully, drew people into sobject on an
Figure 30: sobject; Exterior; Mirror Erectus

investigative journey (Figures30/31/32). Fully
reflective pieces also remained outside. For
instance, remaining outside was Mirror Erectus
(Figures 30/31), a purely reflective piece which
distorted the body as it merged the viewer’s body
with its own form of mirrored observation. A circular
mirror onto which I taped a grid and on the top of
which I attached a ‘dummy’ camera gave the illusion

Figure 31: sobject (exterior); Mirror Erectus (Close-Up)

of observation and hopefully, as I mentioned above,
drew people into the space (Figure 33).

As one approached sobject, from the outside (Figure
34) ,one was engaged by the sound of the looping
Order to Perform Alternative Service and faced with
the looping video which distorted and morphed with
the grid support (Figure 21). As one moved around
the outside walls of the installation, one would
Figure 32: sobject (Exterior); Mirrored Grid and Camera

immediately come into contact with examples of
non-reciprocated observation and surveillance

(Figures 12/30/31/32).
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As one moved into the space of sobject, one
would come into contact with a large wooden
crate, the same type of crate one might receive a
large scale television set in (Figure 34/34a). A fisheye mirror was affixed on the outside of this crate,
creating yet another illusion of observation
(Figure 34/ 34a/40). It soon became obvious that
monitors were, in fact, projecting and expressing
reception in unusual but definite ways. Moving
further inside sobject, it became clear that the
crate did contain a large screen television set,
Figure 34: sobject; Installation View (as one approaches entrance); Crate
and Fish- Eye

which was actually a monitor projecting an image
facing toward the outside wall of the gallery. The
images were projected into a series of separated
mirrors, structured on points in an imaginary grid
(Figures 34/34a/44). However, just as this
realization took place, the photographed image of
the painting, from which the bench was made,
became visible on the opposite wall, directly
across the space (Figure 35), deferring one’s
investigation of the monitor in the crate (Figure
44). As they entered the viewing position for the
photograph of the painting, sitting on the
couch/bench, for instance, opposite the crate,
their image was immediately transferred behind

Figure 35: sobject; Installation View (from inside)

them in an act of not-yet reciprocated surveillance
(Figure44). Once the viewer became aware that

they were, in fact, sitting on the painting, turned bench/ couch, at which they were looking in the
photograph on the wall, the investigation into the large-scale monitor behind them ensued. This was
due to the surveillance camera in the photographed image of the painting on the wall. In addition, a
monitor was hidden under the bench (Figure 41), which contained the images of others being surveyed
in another part of the gallery. Once turned around, and more closely engaged with the large-scale
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monitor on the opposite wall of the
photograph of the painting, it became clear
that the image in the crate was of their act of
viewing the simulacrum of the painting of
which the couch was made (Figure 44);
however, they were no longer in the
viewfinder of the camera and only an image
of an empty couch was portrayed back in the
crate (Figure 44).
Figure 34a: sobject; Fish-Eye and crate

As viewers then moved further inside sobject, they became entangled in a series of similar processes.
People were viewed in the act of viewing, while their images became distorted, flattened and removed
from their access, just out of sight (Figure 35/37/38/39/40/41/42). However, witnessing others in the
same process, people could and did easily work together to participate in the re-appropriative act of
first, uncovering the non-reciprocated source of this distortion, mutation and deferral, and second,
through their active reciprocation, challenge the classic modes of non-reciprocated observation by
playfully engaging, acting, and abandoning traditional assumptions about public and private behavior,
discipline, order and control. This created for an actively engaged, actively encountered, social
experience.
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Figure 37: sobject; Deferred Image (left) Monitor Tower

Figure 43: Man on the Couch/Bench

Figure 38: sobject; Girl Looking

74

Figure 39: Bench/Couch/ Artifice/ Photograph

Figure 40: sobject; Fish-Eye
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Figure 41: sobject; Monitored Couch

Figure 42; sobject; Divided Image
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Figure 44: sobject; Crated Surveillance Image from the Couch/Bench
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7
Introduction
Ending with an introduction is the only way sobject can begin again. Which, as my Conclusion in this
text’s prologue described, is already conditioned by whole sets and series of predetermined conclusions,
most of which, if ‘you’ have actually read this far, are more clear to ‘you’ at this point. However, through
the production of sobject, these sets and series became reconfigured through different ‘orders’ and
became re-‘corded’ for differently constructed ‘ports’. The sets and series of force, long-since
establishing themselves in the shape of these introductory presumptions, as they were in the conclusion
of this thesis’ prologue, are still waiting to enact the shape of what is to come.

As I have mentioned throughout this paper, sobject was a process animated by a couple groups of
seemingly simple questions, however difficult they turned out to be to solve, and however obtuse and
impenetrable my attempts here to describe them has, at times, been.

How to make artwork within an institution of art that is both critical of those modes of
institutionalization and yet participatory? How can processes and institutionalized spaces associated
with binaries between autonomy and social praxis be brought together to create productive, openended forms of each, in an effort to create an engagement between others, in a way that allows for new
subjective positions and reinvented form(s)to take place. In essence, how to uncouple what Adorno has
poignantly referred to as constitutive subjectivity, from the means-end efficiency of our increasingly
segmented, monitored, corporatized and regulated nodes of leisure and work, hyper-regulated,
monitored and divided as they are by image, semblance, instrumentation and artifice? It was my
assumption that in order to begin to strategize just how to go about this process in the field of aesthetic
production, I needed to unravel my aesthetic assumptions. One would first need to inquire into the
structures and modes of historical, social and cultural mediation, which developed through aesthetic
production in the modern era. There may not be a more dominant and pervasive development for
societal mediation than the development of modern medical perception, which then developed into
institutionalized disciplines and further into the birth of prisons and clinics and their associated sciences.
The constellative overlaps between this genealogical process, and the ways in which art as an institution
has developed, punctuates the powers of both integrated processes culturally, economically, and, of
course, politically. Another artist may find this process trite with over-criticality or a needless excursion
down already paved roads, all the more reason, in my mind, to continue down them. In the slick
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avenues and monitored thoroughfares of contemporary aesthetic complicity and its theoretical
strategies, to look away, to look through, to permeate image and semblance with subjective charge—to
appropriate, deconstruct, reconstruct and discard—is looking, (un)looking like never before in the new,
unplanned forms of communicative exchange and interaction yet to be realized. In a process of
historical inquiry into the nodes in which such subjectivity has been and continues to be significantly
coupled with the quickening ends of objectified, scientific, disciplined progress, that feeling felt
everywhere in society, connected to a persistent and painful predictability, has always been positioning
a multitude of ‘now(s) of a particular recognizability.’ So how does one continue this process without
falling into the same processes and pitfalls one is critically engaging with?

For the production of sobject a shift in the way I viewed criticality was connected to ultimate decisions
and insights I came to about reception and agency. When I began sobject, the priority I afforded
criticality with respect to history, culture, art and their institutions had more to do with the transference
of potential content. I labored under the assumption that I could relay information aligned with my own
specific perspective. While I intend to continue to develop this historical methodology moving forward,
codifying research into artistic production, a significant shift has occurred in the way I view reception
and the important, though imperfect, institution of art. As I have stated throughout this thesis, the drive
to attempt to control ‘content’ through forms in a receptive process, which will always move beyond any
capacity to instrumentally contain and capture its multiple complex levels and positions of sobjective
register, can be directly connected to the totalizing structures from whence this inquiry developed. So
my ideas circulating around criticality developed, through sobject, into something else. They began to
have less to do with the transfer of communication, of specific ideas, and more to do with the opening
up of divergent, altered, multiplying and splintering forms of aesthetic communication. This was made
available through a process that, while animating and imitating some of the historical developments in
the production of artifice, semblance and image in art and science, in fact, enacted some contemporary
modes of artifice and image production in their own constellated ways. This enabled a simultaneous
uncoupling and reconfiguration of artifice, semblance and image for multiple, open, sobjective, social
praxis. So criticality, through the production of sobject, moved from a concept closely associated with
receptive transfer, to one more closely associated with a methodology from which to find and explore
new forms of social participation, none of which would be possible without the non-existent spaces of
autonomy, kept working in institutions of art, to some degree, as emaciated as they may seem at times.
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A solution I came to through sobject, had to do with autonomy and my critical engagement with it. It
allowed me to reconceptualize autonomy in a way that wrenched it from its theorized art-institutional
framework, and was closely aligned with the original hypothesis behind my interest in critically engaging
with autonomy in the first place, namely that autonomy does not really exist. Autonomy exists as a
conceptual construct where artists (and scientists) can work and produce without determinative logic
and its social structures continually assessing its utility, and thus, it has tremendous social praxis.
Unfortunately, this is sometimes seen as the great privilege of art, and because of this, can also be the
cause of great difficulty, as it is easily categorized as useless. Just because something may be without
specific or immediately perceived use does not mean it is useless. This is nothing new. But, as we enter
the era of ‘return-on-investment’ University missions, it will be a continual challenge. However,
following Adorno, in nearly every contradiction, paradox and direct confrontation between Humanity
and its (s)objects, there are subjective remainders seeking connection through inter-sobjectivity: the
sediment in the form of that which unitary, over-instrumental reason can never fully dominate.

Historical genealogies are an important element to critically engaging the contemporary moment to
help better understand some of the ontological coupling involved with the objects which we are in
continuous confluence with every day. However, as I mentioned in this prologue, because of the speed
at which technology and its instruments have developed over the last ten to twenty years, historical
genealogy is not sufficient, on its own, to do the work of opening-up, analyzing and synthesizing the new
in ways that open access and ensure ethical work. It is through collaborative work between the arts and
the sciences that things like instrumentation and institutionalization can be refunctioned and
redeveloped in ways that produce new developments for each. If sobject created anything, it was
awareness that reception and sobjectivity cannot be restrained, separated or completely predicted, in
any form(s). Moving forward, I will look for ways to bring science, instrumentation and objectivity
together with artistic practice and sobjectivity in ways that produce new beginnings and possibilities.

I will continue to engage with research into surveillance and its instrumentation, as it interpolates with
certain types of looking and bio-powered behavior. It will take concerted work to ‘re’ ‘order’ and ‘re’
‘cord’ the ‘ports’, in a process of inter-sobjectivity.
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9
NOTES
1

For a great discussion about theoretical inconsistencies, curatorial and acquisitioning contradictions of Alfred Barr
Jr., the curator of the Museum of Modern Art, and theorist Clement Greenberg, occurring between a burgeoning
Pop Art on the one hand, being produced by Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg and Andy Warhol and the second
generation of Abstract Expressionism of Jules Olitski, Kenneth Noland and sculptor Anthony Caro on the other,
See: Frascina, Francis; Harris, Jonathan; Harrison, Charles; Wood, Paul; Modernism in Dispute: Art Since the Forties,
Yale UP/ Open University, New Haven & London, 1993. Print. pp. 184-185.
2

I am referring to what Jacques Ranciere refers to as the “dramaturgy of redemption and sin,” which has more or
less haunted critical aesthetic theory since the beginning of the Twentieth-Century. Two competing but equally
contradictory notions of negation are connected to the two playwrights: Berthold Brecht and Antonin Artaud. Both
artists’ theories involve differing motivations for and of both, art as an institution and the concept of experience.
Artaud theorizes that one should use the theater to eliminate itself by creating productions which in essence
abolish the construct and artifice of traditional theater by creating the dramatic action in the audience. Brecht also
works to eliminate theater through its own use by attempting to construct theatrical works out of, and through,
the social and material construction of artifice. By emphasizing the artificial nature of the relationship between the
spectacle and the audience, Brecht furthers his contemplative mimesis of injustice and social subordination by
focusing on historical allegory and archetypes, drawing parallels and differences between historical social life and
contemporary life. Artaud would like to annihilate the institution of art in favor of lived, direct experience, whereas
Brecht would like to instill a kind of contemplative awareness of political injustice through a modern version of
mimesis. Both presuppose, however, a limited subjective capacity of the audience. They both assume that those in
a theorized group called the masses need emancipation. As if those in the audience had not already developed
their own modes of subjective action in their own lives. See: Ranciere, Jacques; The Emancipated Spectator, Trans.
Gregory Elliot, Verso. London/New York 2009, Chapter 2, pp.26-49.
For a wonderful ‘anthology’ of different modes of Modern and European Experience, see: Jay, Martin; The Songs of
Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme, University of California Press, 2005.
3

See: Bourriard, Nicolas; Relational Aesthetics, Trans. Simon Pleasance & Fronza Woods with Mathieu Copeland,
les presses du reél, 2002. pp.13.
4

See: Drucker, Johanna; Sweet Dreams: Contemporary Art and Complicity, University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 7.

5

For complicity see: Ibid. For two excellent art-historical genealogies which highlight the insular, economic and
culturally integrated ways in which modern art-historical fields weren’t just perpetuated, but created through a
series of contradictions, oppositions and biases see: Drucker, Johanna; Theorizing Modernism: Visual Art and the
Critical Tradition, Columbia UP, NY 1994 and Frascina, Francis; Harris, Jonathan; Harrison, Charles; Wood, Paul;
Modernism in Dispute: Art Since the Forties, Yale UP/ Open University, New Haven & London, 1993. With reference
to ‘culture industries’, plural, and economic systems, I am invoking an entire lineage of British Cultural Studies
from Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, E.P. Thompson, Stuart Hall and Dick Hebdige all of which begin with Karl
Marx and Antonio Gramsci and eventually integrate with Louis Althuser to develop ideas of cultural hegemony
(Gramsci), the Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser) which, while placing quite a bit more emphasis on culture
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(superstructure) work to show the more complex and contradictory ways in which culture is sometimes
determined by power, politics and economy. However, this work seeks and often finds areas in which such ‘overdetermination is shown to be, just that, over-determined—where cultural resistance and expression have, in fact,
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